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Abstract
JESSE BREEDLOVE. Echoes of Vision: Mental Imagery in the Human Brain. (Under
the direction of THOMAS NASELARIS).
When you picture the face of a friend or imagine your dream house, you are using the
same parts of your brain that you use to see. How does the same system manage to both
accurately analyze the world around it and synthesize visual experiences without any
external input at all? We approach this question and others by extending the wellestablished theory that the human visual system embodies a probabilistic generative
model of the visual world. That is, just as visual features co-occur with one another in the
real world with a certain probability (the feature “tree” has a high probability of occurring
with the feature “green”), so do the patterns of activity that encode those features in the
brain. With such a joint probability distribution at its disposal, the brain can not only infer
the cause of a given activity pattern on the retina (vision), but can also generate the
probable visual consequence of an assumed or remembered cause (imagery).
The formulation of this model predicts that the encoding of imagined stimuli in lowlevel visual areas resemble the encoding of seen stimuli in higher areas. To test this
prediction we developed imagery encoding models—a novel tool that reveals how the
features of imagined stimuli are encoded in brain activity. We estimated imagery
encoding models from brain activity measured while subjects imagined complex visual
stimuli, and then compared these to visual encoding models estimated from a matched
viewing experiment.

viii

Consistent with our proposal, imagery encoding models revealed changes in spatial
frequency tuning and receptive field properties that made early visual areas during
imagery more functionally similar to higher visual areas during vision. Likewise, signal
and noise properties of the voxel activation between vision and imagery favor the
generative model interpretation.
Our results provide new evidence for an internal generative model of the visual
world, while demonstrating that vision is just one of many possible forms of inference
that this putative internal model may support.
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Chapter 1 : Introduction
What better way to demonstrate the rich and complex internal environment of the
brain than through the ability to experience a scene in its absence? While its exact nature
and utility have been subjected to exhaustive debate (as will be discussed later), it is
difficult to deny that the thing we call “mental imagery” is intimately intertwined with
our thoughts and daily experiences. Imagery-like phenomena appear to be associated with
a plethora of cognitive and perceptual processes including spatial navigation (Byrne et al.
2007), dreams (Horikawa et al. 2013), future planning (Szpunar et al. 2007), and
language comprehension (Just et al. 2004). Imagery is also thought to be involved in
rehearsal (Savaki & Raos 2019), such as in sports (Filgueiras et al. 2018), and is thought
to be linked to creativity (Palmiero et al. 2015).
While mental imagery’s connection to our normal, everyday experiences is in itself
interesting, it is in the context of clinical pathologies that the importance of advancing
our understanding of imagery’s underlying mechanisms is most apparent. An abundance
of research on this topic has demonstrated that the presence of invasive or otherwise
dysfunctional mental images across neuropsychiatric disorders is staggering, showing up
in almost every major recognized category including anxiety, mood, addiction, and
psychotic disorders as well as eating disorders and degenerative diseases (Brewin et al.
2010; Hackmann & Holmes 2004; Holmes et al. 2019; Holmes & Mathews 2010).
The manner and extent in which mental images are involved varies across disorders.
When they are excessively intrusive, unwanted, and pervasive they can be associated
with a number of anxiety disorders (Hirsch & Holmes 2007). This is most in post1

traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD (Hackmann & Holmes 2004). A core symptom used to
diagnose this disorder is the reliving of a traumatic event (American Psychiatric
Association 2013), often through “flashbacks”, which are invasive and upsetting mental
images related to the original event. Not only are these perceptual experiences a sensitive
and specific indicator of PTSD in trauma survivors (Duke et al. 2008), their features
(such as a sense of happening “here and now”) can be early predictors of the severity and
continuation of the symptoms beyond the immediate aftermath of the event (Kleim et al.
2007; Michael et al. 2005). Intrusive mental imagery is more than just a hallmark
symptom of PTSD; the re-experiencing of traumatic memories through flashbacks may
actually serve to reinforce and maintain the chronic disorder (Brewin 2011).
While the presence of intrusive images is a feature most often associated with PTSD,
they are also prevalent in obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), occurring in up to 7590% of patients (Moritz et al. 2018; Speckens et al. 2007; Lipton et al. 2010). In these
cases, the characteristic obsessions of the disorder are accompanied by vivid and
distressing images, such as seeing or feeling dirt on one’s skin or disturbing images of
harming a loved one (Moritz et al. 2018). The presence of these intrusive images is
associated with heightened anxiety (Speckens et al. 2007), and the strength of the
imagery is associated with increased compulsive behavior in an apparent attempt to
neutralize the images, subsequently leading to more impairment in daily function (Moritz
et al. 2018). Interestingly, the most dominant sense for intrusive imagery in OCD is
visual (Moritz et al. 2018; Speckens et al. 2007).
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Recurrent and unwanted mental images have also turned up in a number of other
anxiety disorders. Examples include third-person images of oneself looking anxious and
sweating in social anxiety disorder (Hirsch & Holmes 2007), picturing being trapped in
an inescapable situation or location in agoraphobia (Day et al. 2004), or imagining
oneself as deceased in health anxiety disorder (Wells & Hackmann 1993).
Maladapted mental imagery is also found in mood disorders, often manifesting as an
imbalance in the emotional affect produced by images. Individuals with depression have
an impaired ability to imagine positive future events while their ability to vividly imagine
negative events remains intact. Moreover, the positive events that they are able to
voluntarily invoke are associated with less positive feelings (Holmes, Lang, et al. 2008).
Much like the anxiety disorders, mood disorders (including major depression and bipolar
disorder) are accompanied by intrusive involuntary negative imagery as well (Myers et
al. 2007; Gregory et al. 2010). Outside of depressive states, patients with bipolar disorder
additionally experience intense positive imagery (Close et al. 2014) which is thought to
exacerbate the mania associated with the disorder (Holmes, Geddes, et al. 2008).
Moreover, it appears that mental imagery has an even more sinister role in mood
disorders as it may facilitate suicide in depressed populations via habituation, planning,
and rehearsal (Braithwaite et al. 2010; O’Connor et al. 2018; Crane et al. 2012).
A number of studies have demonstrated a role of mental imagery in pathologies
beyond mood and anxiety disorders. For example, intrusive mental images are also
associated with eating disorders, such as body dysmorphic disorder, where the person has
distorted and negative mental images of their bodily appearance (Osman et al. 2004).
3

Exceptionally vivid perception (MCGHIE & CHAPMAN 1961; Freedman 1974) and
mental imagery accompany schizophrenia, the latter of which has been suggested as a
trait marker of the disease (Oertel et al. 2009; Sack et al. 2005). A study investigating
possible relationships between imagery and visual hallucinations in Parkinson’s disease
found that patients defined as “hallucinators” had stronger mental imagery than controls
and the strength of imagery was correlated with degree of hallucinations (Muller et al.
2014).
The above mentioned research suggests that, in some cases, dysfunctional mental
imagery is not only present but may also serve to maintain—or even play a causal role
in— the disorder. While our appreciation of this is growing, an understanding of the
underlying mechanisms of dysfunctional imagery is disproportionate to the clinical
relevance. To capture how imagery gone awry in pathology we must first understand how
it works in the healthy brain.
As is discussed in the next section, while we have made great strides in imagery
research in the past few decades, we have, in some sense, uncovered more questions than
we have answered. Consequently, our understanding of the generation, functional role,
and even nature of normal imagery is still lacking.
Fortunately, recent advances in computational modeling offer renewed potential for
imagery research, providing the framework and tools needed to build, test, and
manipulate models of human systems (Kriegeskorte 2015; Kriegeskorte & Douglas
2018). Armed with these new tools, the current study seeks to understand how visual
4

mental imagery works in the healthy human brain; a task that, as it turn out, is in no sense
a new endeavor.

History of Mental Imagery
Long-Standing Questions
Take a moment to imagine your favorite coffee mug. What color is it? Does it have a
handle or any words written on the side? What are the relative proportions of its
circumference to height? For a different example, consider the face of an analog clock at
6:50. Is the angle made by its hour and minute hands smaller or larger than 90 degrees?
In either case, was your experience at all like seeing your mug or a clock face? If so,
did seeing the image in your “mind’s eye” aid you in answering the questions?
Incidentally, these are some of mental imagery’s most ancient questions: 1) What is the
nature of mental images? Are they, as the name implies, experienced as visual images?
Or are they better characterized as language-like descriptions? And 2) Why do humans
have mental images? Specifically, do they have any cognitive utility?
The various answers offered to these questions stretch back in time over two
millennia and have substantially shaped the way we think about and research mental
imagery today. Therefore, to understand the current landscape of imagery research and its
gaps in knowledge, it is useful to consider the history of these questions and the
philosophical and scientific research they sparked.
The first question concerning the nature of images in particular split all conversations
about imagery into two views rather early on (MacKisack et al. 2016), a dichotomy that
5

has survived the intervening years. On one side, there are those who believe that mental
images are experienced in the perceptual sense and contain depictive visual features. On
the other are those who believe that they are better characterized as descriptions. The
dichotomy eventually culminated in what was dubbed the “imagery debate” in the 20th
century, and the defenders of the depictive and descriptive sides have been branded the
“iconophiles” and “iconophobes”, respectively. Divisions over the question of utility have
been less clear-cut but are generally thought to follow the division over the nature of
mental imagery: those who take mental images to be pictorial are naturally led to
understand them as things that can be used to complete cognitive tasks, much like
percepts can be examined and used, while most who believe that images do not
contribute anything extra to cognition tend to align with the iconophobe stance
(MacKisack et al. 2016; Thomas 2018).
In the following sections, I briefly discuss a few key actors in the history of
philosophical research on imagery, and consider the answers they offered for one or both
of these two main questions: the question of the nature of mental images and the question
of their utility.
I then transition into the scientific investigation of mental images, in particular within
cognitive psychology and neuroscience, and consider what insight they have brought to
these longstanding questions as well as new questions they have unearthed. Finally, I
discuss what kind of model of imagery would be necessary to address these questions.
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In the meantime, we start in ancient Greece, where the stage for the imagery debate
was first set.
Mental images as depictions – the Iconophiles
The oldest surviving philosophical discussions on the nature of mental images comes
from the classical Greek thinkers in the 4th century BCE. One of the most extensive
writings on this comes down from Aristotle (Thomas 2018) who believed that sensation
was the process through which forms, actively emanating from their objects, collide with
and impress themselves upon the sensory organ of the observer, much like a stamp into
wax. These impressions start internal movements which can later be re-instantiated in the
absence of the object as mental images, or phantasmata. Aristotle therefore saw
phantasmata as being necessarily like the sensory experiences from which they came:
visual mental images were echoes of visual sensation. It was particularly on the point of
“usefulness” that Aristotle deviated from his mentor, Plato. While Plato treated mental
images as incidental and misleading counterfeits twice removed from the eternal forms
(MacKisack et al. 2016), the Aristotelian perspective granted mental imagery a central
role in human cognition, necessary for motivation, decision-making, communication,
dreams, and even thought itself: “the soul never thinks without a phantasma” (Aristotle
1984).
Even as human understanding of anatomy and physiology evolved substantially (such
as recognizing the brain as the center of mental processing rather than the heart), many
upheld a similar depictive treatment of mental imagery. In the 18th century, Hume
described mental images, or ideas, as faint versions of visual percepts, virtually identical
7

in content and character and differing only in their degree of intensity (Hume 2003).
Nearly a century later, Descartes, following a similar vein and foreshadowing
neuroscientific research to come, proposed a common brain substrate (albeit erroneously
the pineal gland) for vision and imagery, whereby stored information about the percept
could recreate patterns on this shared structure, bringing the experience back into
consciousness (Thomas 2018).
The depictive stance was almost entirely silenced during a decades-long bout of
behaviorism that denied imagery research scientific integrity altogether, but was
resurrected in the late 1900s, this time with the support of psychophysical and, soon after,
neuroscientific methods (MacKisack et al. 2016). The most prominent present day
champion of the iconophile stance is Dr. Stephen Kosslyn, who developed a thorough
theoretical model of mental imagery. According to this theory, feedback connections
match stored memories with visual representations in lower-level areas so that, during
imagery, the details of some recalled object can be realized in the “visual buffer” (i.e., the
primary visual cortex). These visual details (which allow you to answer questions such as
“are a German Shepherd’s ears pointy?”) are only implicit in the higher-level
representation from which they were constructed: “because visual memories are stored in
[an] abstract format during perception, in order to recall the local geometry of shape it is
necessary to generate mental images in topographically organized areas” (Kosslyn et al.
2006, p.142). This generation of images in the retinotopic visual cortex affords them the
same explicit spatial and otherwise depictive properties that percepts have. Consequently,
Kosslyn’s theory gives imagery special cognitive utility: images allow you to become
8

conscious of, interpret, and reason about things that are not currently available to your
eyes (Kosslyn et al. 2006).
Mental images as descriptions – the iconophobes
Similarly distributed throughout imagery’s history are arguments in favor of the
descriptive, or “propositional”, account of mental imagery. One such argument, made by
Dennett (Dennett 1969) and Shorter (Shorter 2007), involves the issue of indeterminacy,
a perceived contradiction in which one can imagine an object (such as a coffee mug) with
certainty while simultaneously not being able to, or even needing to, imagine a given
detail of that object (such as its color). Supporters of this argument posited that this
paradox, along with others innate to the pictorial image, could be resolved by treating
mental imagery as a “language-like” code that represents images much like words
represent objects and ideas rather than depicting them (MacKisack et al. 2016). Dr.
Zenon Pylyshyn, a major advocate of the propositional stance (and usually positioned in
direct opposition to Kosslyn), further developed this idea by drawing from ideas
emerging in computer science research, arguing that mental images are “more accurately
referred to as symbolic descriptions than as images in the usual sense” (Pylyshyn 1973).
Concerning the utility of images, Pylyshyn has also proposed a “null hypothesis”, stating
that there is nothing special in particular about mental imagery: “reasoning with mental
images involves the same form of representation and the same processes as that of
reasoning in general, except that the content or subject matter of thoughts experienced as
images includes information about how things would look.” (Pylyshyn 2002) –a
hypothesis that he believes we have yet to reject.
9

Contemporary Scientific Findings
Although the history of philosophical research on imagery may have spanned at least
two millennia (MacKisack et al. 2016; Thomas 2018), a scientific understanding of
imagery has emerged only in the last several decades (Kosslyn & Thompson 2003;
MacKisack et al. 2016; Crawford I.P. Winlove et al. 2018; Albright 2012). A major
driver of this understanding has been the development of rigorous psychophysical
methods for probing mental imagery (Podgorny & Shepard 1978; Kosslyn et al. 1978;
Ishai & Sagi 1995; Pearson et al. 2008).
Many of these methods provided evidence for spatially structured representations of
imagined objects and consequently have been used as arsenal by the iconophiles. A
fundamental example of these cognitive studies involves having subjects judge whether
two drawings of 3D geometric objects rotated relative to one another are the same 3D
object or different. These studies found that the time it takes to make a decision
corresponds linearly to the angle in which the object has to be rotated in order to be
directly compared to the other (Shepard & Metzler 1971), suggesting that subjects were
mentally rotating visual representations of the objects in their mind’s eye. Others have
found that concrete nouns that can have physical, visual representations such as “chair”,
are easier to remember than more abstract formless nouns such as “truth” (Paivio 1963).
Taken together, these results suggest that mental imagery somehow serves a facilitative
role in tasks such as learning and decision making (MacKisack et al. 2016).
Equally important has been the development of neuroimaging tools, particularly
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), for noninvasively measuring brain
10

activity of humans engaged in mental imagery. A central finding of several decades of
fMRI studies of imagery has been the confirmation of an extensive overlap between
imagery and vision in the brain. At the level of brain activity, these studies have revealed
that imagery engages the same brain areas that we use to see (Wheeler et al. 2000;
Crawford I P Winlove et al. 2018), including even the primary visual cortex (Kosslyn &
Thompson 2003). At the level of representation, studies have demonstrated the presence
of correlated multivoxel activity patterns between vision and imagery (Stokes et al. 2009;
Reddy et al. 2010; Cichy et al. 2012; Lee et al. 2012; Albers et al. 2013; Bosch et al.
2014). Importantly, the activity patterns generated during imagery encode the same kinds
of low-level visual features encoded during vision, such as spatial frequency and
retinotopic location (Slotnick & Thompson 2018), which can be used to decode imagined
content (Naselaris et al. 2014; Thirion et al. 2006; Horikawa & Kamitani 2017).
New Questions and the Echoes of Old
Considering the psychophysical and neuroimaging results discussed above, can we
say that we have finally laid the age-old questions of nature and utility to rest? Many take
the activation of early visual cortex and decoding of low-level features of the imagined
images as solid evidence that the images themselves are depictive in nature and consider
the debate a closed book (Kosslyn et al. 2006). However others remain unconvinced,
pointing out that activity in lower-level visual areas, even if structured, does not in itself
necessitate that mental imagery relies on actual visual images. It could instead be the case
that their activation represents mere epiphenomenal side effects which are not used in the
essential processing that gives rise to our imagery experiences and observed behaviour
11

(Pylyshyn 2003; Thomas 2018). Indeed, our ability to decode specific information from
an area of the brain does not in itself demonstrate that the rest of the brain uses that
information for the process in question.
On the question of utility, the opposing side also argues that we have yet to reject the
null hypothesis, that there is no evidence that imagery is a special form of reasoning and
therefore has not been proven to add anything special to cognition (Pylyshyn 2002). On
the other hand, the cognitive and neuroimaging findings discussed above seem to provide
an intuitive argument for how mental imagery could in fact be special: lower areas could
be used to “fill in” details associated with and left unspecified by a recalled memory or
generated scenario. However, this intuition has yet to be formalized. Our research efforts
have therefore reframed and provided some insight into the questions of nature and utility
but these questions remain open nonetheless.
The neuroscientific findings have also unearthed new, equally exciting questions that
the field has only just begun to grapple with.
The first, which I will call the synthesis question, arises from the fact that the visual
cortex is involved (whether you believe its involvement to be consequential or not) in
both vision and imagery. How does a single apparatus become involved in both analysis
and synthesis? Many agree that image generation must entail some sort of reversal of the
visual cortex. Indeed, imaging studies indicate that imagery is associated with top-down
activation from higher visual areas such as parietal and frontal cortices (Mechelli 2004;
Stokes et al. 2009). However, an explicit model about how mental imagery arises in this
12

context or how the representations imposed on lower-level areas are computationally
determined has yet to defined or tested.
The second question has been shaped by the historical dichotomy discussed above—
most efforts to understand mental imagery have been aimed at testing the iconophile
theory. The consequence has been extensive examination of how vision and imagery are
similar. While there may be substantial overlap in the substrate and types of
representations between vision and imagery, our subjective experiences at the very least
lead us to understand that there must be differences in the specific states associated with
the two. Therefore, fMRI studies have succeeded in putting an upper bound on how
different seen and mental images can be, but have yet to actually reveal how and why
seen and mental images differ.

The Model We Need
In the following section I consider what elements and assumptions a model of mental
imagery would require to effectively address the outstanding questions detailed above.
Specifically, I attempt to describe a model that can speak to why we have images and the
divide over what they are like, as well as provide a story for how they are generated from
the same substrate as vision while leading to two different phenomenological
experiences. As I address these in turn, I add to the components that build up our theory.
Addressing the Nature Debate with Reinstatement in a Visual Hierarchy
Why has the imagery debate remained an open dispute for so long? Some have
suggested that views were so strongly polarized because the opposing defenders
13

themselves experienced varying degrees of vividness in their own mental imagery
(Reisberg et al. 2003).
Another (potentially related) possibility is that the debate was based on a false
dichotomy whereby it was assumed that the two views were necessarily competing and
mutually exclusive hypotheses on the nature of representations in the brain. This may
stem from a separation in how we experience percepts and thoughts: while percepts feel
concrete and external to oneself, thoughts are incorporeal and private. Perhaps when
presented with something that is positioned in the undefined space between, we feel
compelled to put it in either one bin or the other.
However, neurophysiological and imaging studies have now made it clear that the
brain contains hierarchical structures (Markov et al. 2013; Piras et al. 2017). The visual
system in particular contains multiple distinct areas that can represent the same external
object at various, increasingly abstract levels. From a collection of edges all the way up
to semantic categories and beyond, the visual system seems less of an isolated structure
and more of a series of representations that runs seamlessly into the rest of the brain.
Given this information, it becomes much less of a clear-cut task to draw a line in the
brain where vision stops and non-visual thought begins. Therefore a mental image could
occupy, just as percepts do, both a depictive representation and a higher-level “languagelike” representation.
Here we present a model of mental imagery that emphasizes its representation across
a hierarchy of visual structures. Therefore we start with multiple discrete levels arranged
14

in a chain (nodes in Figure 1.1), where each level represents the activity pattern in a given
area of the brain encoding some set of features.
Interestingly, as Thomas (2018) points out, most on either side of the debate have
assumed intentionality: “A mental image is always an image of something or other
(whether real or unreal), in the same sense that perception (whether veridical or not) is
always perception of something.”
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Figure 1.1 Imagery as reinstatement in a hierarchical generative model. Schematic showing
vision and imagery in a recurrently connected (gray arrows) hierarchy of visual areas. Each node
represents the activity pattern at a given level along the hierarchy while viewing (top) or
imagining (bottom) some stimulus (s). When seeing s, the retina (𝑟0 ) is clamped to s while the
remaining nodes converge to an activity pattern that encodes the causes of this pattern on the
retina. When imagining s, the retina is clamped to an uninformative value (e.g. 𝑟0 = 0) while at
least one higher processing stage is clamped to the visual activity pattern that would be present
when viewing s (i.e. reactivation; orange box). The remaining nodes below the clamped area
converge to an activity that encodes the consequences of the cause specified by the reactivated
level.

We take this shared intentionality to imply that there is shared representation at some
level of the visual hierarchy. For example, whether one is seeing or imagining a zebra,
one knows that the percept or image is of a zebra and not, say, a tiger. We might expect
then that some area, perhaps at the level of processing responsible for encoding the
abstract “zebra”, converges during imagery to the activity it would be when seeing a
zebra. Our model therefore assumes that during imagery there is a reinstatement of the
visual activity pattern somewhere along the brain’s hierarchy. Likely, this reinstatement
occurs relatively high in the visual hierarchy given the high degree of similarity between
vision and imagery in higher visual areas (Pearson et al. 2015; Dijkstra et al. 2019). We
refer to the state of a processing level being held to a certain activity pattern as clamping
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(denoted by the dashed orange box in Figure 1.1). Note that this just assumes that imagery
involves reactivation at some point in the hierarchy. More notable is how the activations
of the rest of the hierarchy are determined during imagery. Our proposed mechanism for
this is discussed below.

Addressing the Question of Analysis/Synthesis with a Generative Model of Visual
Perception
For our question of how the same system can both analyze retinal input (vision) and
synthesize without input (imagery) we turn to a model of vision that is an alternative to
the standard feed-forward discriminative model, one that posits that the brain must
already contain the ability to produce images in order to see. Evidence for this has
emerged primarily from studies designed to test, or derive the consequences of, the
hypothesis that the visual system embodies a generative model of the visual world (Bar
2009; Friston 2005; Lee & Mumford 2003; Rao & Ballard 1999; Spratling 2016; Yuille
& Kersten 2006). Generative models are systems of knowledge that support inference
about what is uncertain given what is known (Christopher M. Bishop 2006). As the name
suggests, the hallmark of a generative model of the visual world is the ability to generate
images. In the context of vision, this means that the brain, with only input sensory nerve
signals to go off of, infers what is out in the world by generating the causes of those
signals. This is sometimes aptly referred to as “analysis by synthesis” (Yuille & Kersten
2006). A variety of phenomena in visual cortex such as spontaneous dynamics (Berkes et
al. 2011), stimulus response non-linearities (Coen-Cagli et al. 2015; Karklin & Lewicki
2009; Rao & Ballard 1999), the encoding of prediction error (Murray et al. 2002; Alink et
al. 2010), the structure of visual representations in low-level (Olshausen & Field 1996)
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and high-level (Stansbury et al. 2013) visual areas, and the emergence of structured
hallucinations as a consequence of damage to the visual system (Reichert et al. 2013) can
be interpreted as evidence that the visual system embeds a generative model of the visual
world and uses it to perform inference. While theories equating vision with inference in a
generative model imply a compelling computational rationale for image generation in the
visual system, an explicit hypothesis about how mental imagery arises in such a system
has yet to be articulated or tested.
We adopt and adapt this theory to describe how vision and imagery might be derived
from a single system. To expand briefly, the generative model (i.e. the visual system)
contains a model of the outside visual world. That is, it replicates the statistical
regularities found between different visual features in the sensory environment in terms
of brain activity patterns that encode those features. Therefore, just as certain features are
likely to co-occur in the external visual world (e.g., the feature “sky” and the feature
“blue”), so too are the activity patterns that encode those features at different levels of the
brain. In this model, seeing then entails using these relationships between features to infer
the causes of the activity pattern on the retina.
What we propose is that imagery—like vision—is defined as inference in the same
generative model. Note that the structure of the model, the hierarchy and the probabilistic
relationships, remain constant. The only thing that changes is the inference that is made:
the activity patterns of the multiple levels of the hierarchy during imagery (the unknown)
is inferred from the activity of the clamped layer (the known) rather than the retina,
which is uninformative. In other words, it can use the relationships specified by the
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model to “unpack” the activations of lower areas that are likely given the activity at the
clamped.
Within the framework of a visual hierarchy, bi-directional connections between levels
(much like those found in the human brain) are needed in order to converge on mutually
consistent representations across the network. Such connections are also necessary to
infer activity in any lower level area given only the activity of a higher level (as is the
case in imagery). Therefore we assume recurrent connections between each layer and the
next that work to spread information started as activation in the clamped layer (whether at
the retina or some level higher up) to the rest of the system (grey arrows in Figure 1.1).

Addressing the Question of Differences Through Independent Models of Imagined
Features
The hierarchical generative model (HGM) theory of imagery that we propose makes
specific predictions about how the activity patterns elicited by the two different types of
inference will compare (see Chapter 2 for full treatment). Revealing any such differences
would require directly comparing explicit, validated models of the features represented
during imagery and vision of the same stimuli. Note that the model for imagery needs to
be estimated directly from signals collected during imagery, independent of vision, in
order to make a meaningful comparison. Previous studies investigating the kinds of
features encoded during imagery have built models based on visual activity patterns and
then tested these models on imagery activity patterns (Naselaris et al. 2014; Senden et al.
2019). While powerful, this tells you how well features encoded during vision can
explain variance during imagery (i.e., how similar imagery is to vision) but falls short of
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telling you to what imagery might otherwise be tuned. We therefore need to rely on a
different experimental paradigm that can tell us what representations are activated by
vision and imagery separately. As the next chapter will detail, the formalization of our
theory predicts an explicit, testable relation between activity during imagery and vision
and reveals a way in which we can directly model the types of features encoded during
imagery.

Addressing the Question of Utility with Formal Inference
A computational model for mental imagery, like the one presented here, has the
advantage over decoding alone in that it provides a testable story for why the brain would
be encoding specific features in the areas that they are found. Therefore it has the
potential to link findings that show visual features are encoded in primary visual areas
during imagery to a theory of imagery utility. Our theory formalizes the intuitions of
utility discussed earlier by equating the “reasoning” supported by mental imagery with
inference in a generative model.
In summary, we propose that mental imagery is inference about the sensory
consequences of predicted or remembered causes in an internal hierarchical generative
model. The following chapters formalize this theory and describe how imagery imposes a
different set of conditions than that of vision, leading to testable predictions about the
types of features encoded during imagery.
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Chapter 2 : A Formalized Theory of Mental Imagery:
Inference in a Hierarchical Generative Model
In this chapter I further describe and formalize the unifying computational account of
vision and imagery proposed above by expanding on an influential theory that describes
vision as probabilistic inference in an internal hierarchical generative model (HGM). The
structure of the HGM and the specifics of the particular formulation used here are
detailed below.

Generative Model of Visual Cortex
As was introduced in Chapter 2, the “generative” portion of the HGM posits that the
visual system performs a sort of “analysis by synthesis”; it makes sense of the stimulusinduced patterns on the retina by attempting to generate the cause of those patterns.
Seeing therefore consists of activity patterns at discrete stages in the brain that encode
different visual features of the proposed cause of the retinal activity. Figure 2.1
illustrates this arrangement: 𝑟0 , … , 𝑟𝐿 are the activity patterns of 𝐿 + 1 stages in the
visual system, where 𝑟0 is the activity pattern of the retina and the remaining are the
activity patterns in functionally distinct areas of the visual cortex (e.g. V1, V2, etc.). The
probability of these activity patterns co-occurring in the network reflect the probability of
the features they encode co-occurring in the visual environment. For example, the feature
“sky” has a high probability of occurring with the feature “blue” (and less so with the
feature “red”), so the activity pattern that encodes “sky” in one visual area has a high
probability of occurring with the activity that encodes “blue” in another area. In this way
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the brain contains a joint probability distribution for all the possible features at all stages,
effectively amounting to an implicit model of the external sensory environment.

Figure 2.1 Vision and imagery in a generative hierarchical network. Schematic showing
vision and imagery in a recurrently connected (gray arrows) hierarchical network. At
equilibrium, the visual activity pattern at a processing stage, 𝑟𝑘 , can be expressed as a
transformation 𝑇𝑘0 (long blue arrow) of activity at the sensor stage 𝑟0 or, equivalently, as a
composition of transformations (shorter blue arrows) of activity patterns from lower stages.
During imagery, 𝑟0 = 0 and at least one higher processing stage is clamped to its visual
activity pattern. Imagery activity patterns beneath the clamped stage (e.g., 𝑟𝑙 ) differ from
their visual activity patterns by an echo Ω. The echo is a transformation from the current to
the clamped layer (shortest blue arrow) and from the clamped layer back down (orange
arrow).
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Hierarchy of Causal Relationships
The model is “hierarchical” because the stages are arranged in a chain and the joint
distribution described above is specified by a hierarchy of causal relationships. In other
words, the activity pattern at the top of the hierarch 𝑟𝐿 encodes features that, in the
sensory environment, cause the features encoded at the stage below. For example, if 𝑟𝐿
encodes object categories, then lower stages might encode visual features like color or
texture that are caused by the presence of an encoded object category. If the object
“zebra” causes the presence of the texture “stripes” in the sensory world, then the activity
pattern in 𝑟𝐿 that encodes “zebra” is likely to co-occur with the activity pattern in 𝑟𝑙<𝐿 that
encodes “stripes”. Similarly, the specific activity pattern in 𝑟𝐿 that encodes “building”
would likely co-occur with an activity pattern in some layer 𝑟𝑙<𝐿 that encodes vertical
edges. Note that in the first example, it is “zebra” that is causally responsible for
generating the feature “stripes” and not the other way around (it is the presence of a zebra
that causes one to see stripes). By maintaining a representation of these causal
relationships, the brain can “explain away” the lower level features by selecting the most
probable cause of them. Also note that many different specific orientations and sizes of
black and white stripes can be associated with a single object category “zebra”, such that
the specifics of the stripes can change over time (as they would if the zebra were to move
about relative to the viewer) while the brain maintains that a zebra is the cause. This
invariance of higher processing stages to changes in lower processing stages is critical to
object identification. However, this also means there is a loss of resolution with ascension
in the visual hierarchy. As will be discussed later, such an asymmetry in the structure of
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the joint probability distribution leads to important differences in outcomes when the
system performs inference under different conditions.
Formally, the hierarchical relationship between activity patterns is expressed by a set
of conditional independence relationships between the various stages. Given an
ordering (0, … , 𝐿) of activity patterns, the joint distribution can be expressed as a product
of conditional distributions that specifies the interaction between one stage and the stage
above it:
[1]
𝐿−1

𝑝(𝑟0 , 𝑟1 , … , 𝑟𝐿 ) = 𝑝(𝑟𝐿 ) ∏ 𝑝(𝑟𝑙 |𝑟𝑙+1 )
𝑙=0

In this hierarchical model, seeing a stimulus (𝑠) means the network is conditioned on
the activity in the bottom most layer (i.e. the retina, 𝑠0 ) being set (or “clamped”) to 𝑠
(Figure 2.1, top). Vision is then the process of sampling activity patterns in all higher
processing stages from the resulting posterior distribution 𝑝(𝑟1 , . . . , 𝑟𝐿 |𝑟0 = 𝑠), so that
that the average activity state for a given visual area, 𝑙
[2]

𝜇𝑙vis = 𝔼 𝑝(𝑟1 ,… ,𝑟𝐿 |𝑟0 =𝑠) [𝑟𝑙 ]

encodes a feature that is the expected cause of the retinal stimulus 𝑠.
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The HGM Expanded to Mental Imagery
We treat mental imagery as a subtly but importantly different conditional inference
within the same HGM. Specifically, we propose that when a mental image of 𝑠 occurs
(Figure 2.1, bottom) the retina is clamped to some uninformative value (e.g., 𝑠0 = 0)
while the activity in some higher layer k is clamped to the expected activity pattern
evoked by seeing 𝑠 (𝑟𝑘 = 𝜇𝑘vis ; e.g. imagining a “house” might set some object
recognition area within temporal lobe to the same activity that would be present there
when seeing a “house”). Mental imagery is then the process by which the activity
patterns in the remaining stages are sampled from the resulting conditional probability
distribution 𝑝(𝑟1 , . . . , 𝑟𝑘−1 , 𝑟𝑘+1 , … , 𝑟𝐿 |𝑟0 = 0, 𝑟𝑘 = 𝜇𝑘vis ). The average activity pattern for
the lth visual area during imagery
[3]
img

𝜇𝑙

= 𝔼 𝑝(𝑟

vis
1 ,...,𝑟𝑘−1 ,𝑟𝑘+1 ,…,𝑟𝐿 |𝑟0 =0,𝑟𝑘 =𝜇𝑘 )

[𝑟𝑙 ]

therefore encodes an expected consequence of the cause specified by clamping the
activity in a high-level visual area.

Vision and Imagery Encoding Models
For most HGMs it is not possible to explicitly write the conditional distribution
without making assumptions about the distributions within the joint (e.g. Gaussianity), as
the solution becomes computationally insurmountable when the variable being integrated
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over has a large number of dimensions. This is especially so in our case where the
posterior consists of the activity patterns of hundreds of thousands of voxels. However,
note that during vision the only source of variance for each processing stage is the
stimulus. Thus, the activity at each individual stage can be expressed as some function of
s (i.e.f(s)).Therefore, without making any assumptions about the distributions, we can
say that the expected activity pattern at 𝑙 during vision, 𝜇𝑙vis , could be represented by
some (possibly nonlinear) transformation, T, from the bottom stage 0 (the source of
explainable variance), to the higher stage 𝑙. We write such a transformation of 𝑠 as 𝑇𝑙0 [𝑠]
where the superscript indicates which stage this function transforms from and the
subscript indicates which stage it transforms to. We refer to any transformation of activity
patterns from a lower to higher stage as a forward transform. Thus the expected activity
pattern at 𝑙 during vision can be expressed as
[4]

𝜇𝑙vis = 𝑇𝑙0 [𝑠]
Incidentally, the expected activities during imagery can also be written as a
transformation of activity patterns from the source of variance to the stage in question.
Only now, as Equation 3 shows, the only source of variance in the hierarchy is the
clamped stage which, when imagining 𝑠, equals the activity at that stage as it were when
viewing 𝑠. Therefore the expected activity patterns during mental imagery can in general
be expressed as
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[5]
img

𝜇𝑙

𝑘

= 𝑇𝑙 [𝜇𝑘vis ]

𝑘

for 𝑙 < 𝑘, where 𝑇𝑙 is a transformation of activity patterns from the clamped stage 𝑘
down to stage 𝑙. We refer to any transformation of activity patterns from a higher to
lower stage as a backward transform and denote it with a bar accent (𝑇).
Furthermore, in a strictly hierarchical architecture, the transformation from any one
stage to another can be decomposed into transformations between intervening stages
(Figure 1.1), e.g. 𝑇𝑘0 = 𝑇𝑘𝑙 ◦ 𝑇𝑙0 where 𝑙 < 𝑘 is some intermediary stage between 0 and 𝑘.
The imagery expected activities can therefore be rewritten as:
[6]
img

𝜇𝑙

𝑘

𝑘

= 𝑇𝑙 [𝑇𝑘0 [𝑠]] = ⏟
𝑇𝑙 ◦ 𝑇𝑘𝑙 ◦ ⏟
𝑇𝑙0 [𝑠]
Ω𝑙,𝑘

𝐸𝑙vis [𝑠]

This equation and the underbrace notations highlight three major points that are
useful for interpreting the relationship between vision and imagery as an experimentally
testable prediction. First, we recognize the rightmost forward transform as a formal
encoding model, denoted E𝑙vis [𝑠]. In the context of visual neuroscience, an encoding
model is a transformation of a visual stimulus into a prediction of evoked brain activity.
A transformation that makes an adequate prediction of brain activity in a given portion of
the brain (e.g. a voxel) serves as an indication of the kinds of information encoded in that
portion. We refer to E𝑙vis [𝑠] as a visual encoding model as it transforms the stimulus 𝑠
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into predicted activity patterns during vision. Thus we see that the expected activity
pattern during mental imagery depends on the way the stimulus 𝑠 is encoded during
vision.
Secondly, the portion denoted by Ω𝑙,𝑘 indicates how the expected activity pattern
during imagery will differ from the expected activity pattern during vision. Notice that
Ω𝑙,𝑘 constitutes a forward transform from stage 𝑙 to stage 𝑘, followed by a backward
transform from stage 𝑘 back to stage 𝑙 (green box in Figure 2.1). It can thus be
understood as an echo of the state of 𝑙 during vision: imagery activity pattern at any one
stage will resemble the visual activity pattern that has been fed forward from that stage to
the clamped stage, then fed back to the original stage. The exact effect of the echo on the
types of features encoded during imagery will be treated in detail in Chapter 5.
Meanwhile, note that unless the feed-back transformation is an inverse of the feedforward transformation the echo will induce a potentially measurable difference between
img

the expected imagery activity pattern 𝜇𝑙

and the expected visual activity pattern 𝜇𝑙vis .

In general, we would expect this difference to manifest as a loss of resolution in areas
below the clamped area during imagery relative to the resolution normally seen in these
areas during vision. This is due to the fact that lower areas during imagery are driven
solely by the clamped area which, being higher in the visual hierarchy, has a lower
inherent resolution compared to the retina. In other words, given the structure of the
HGM proposed here, we expect lower areas during imagery to take on the lowerresolution properties seen in higher areas during vision. Note also that effect of the echo
is compositional in nature, meaning that the distortion that each layer experiences relative
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to its original representation during vision increases moving away from the clamped layer
and toward the bottom layer.
This echo transformation therefore codifies the key signatures of inference we expect
to observe during mental imagery: (1) an inheritance of functional properties from the
reactivated brain area and (2) a gradient in this distortional effect that increases with
hierarchical distance below the reactivated area.
Finally, the arguments above provide a guide for how to reveal the effects of the echo
transformation on the features encoded in imagery activity patterns. Specifically, the
composition of the two underbraced portions (the echo composed with the visual
encoding model) defines something novel to the field: an imagery encoding model.
img

Denoted as E𝑙

[𝑠], the imagery encoding model is similar to its visual counterpart, only

it predicts the activity pattern that will be evoked by imagining 𝑠. Since both the visual
and imagery encoding models accept the same input 𝑠, it should be possible to explicitly
characterize the differences between the encoding of imagined and seen stimuli by
estimating imagery and visual encoding models.
In summary, we propose that imagery is the process of a particular form of conditional
inference in the same HGM that allows us to see our external world. Formulation of this
theory predicts measurable differences between the activity patterns encoding stimuli
during vision and imagery. If the HGM is a good model for both forms of visual
perception and such differences exist, we should be able to detect them by building
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encoding models from brain activity measured during viewing and imagining the same
stimuli.

Specific Aims
To this end, we have designed an experiment to capture brain activity from human
subjects as they view and imagine matched visual stimuli. We have built and compared
encoding models from the resulting activity patterns to test our hypothesized generative
model of mental imagery. These objectives are summarized in the following aims.
Specific Aim 1: Build voxel-wise imagery encoding models. We hypothesized that
imagery encoding models can be successfully measured from fMRI data, used to predict
brain activity to new imagined stimuli, and used to decode the position and content of the
imagined stimuli.
Specific Aim 2: Determine if signatures of inference in a generative model can be
observed during mental imagery in the human brain. We hypothesized that (1) tuning to
imagined features in lower visual areas will more closely resemble tuning to seen features
in higher areas and (2) a gradient in this distortional effect that increases with hierarchical
distance below the reactivated area, demonstrating key signatures of inference that follow
from our formulation of mental imagery as inference in an internal generative model.
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Chapter 3 : Experimental Methods
In this chapter, I describe in detail the experimental design, fMRI processing and
display, training of the encoding models, as well as how specific measures of significance
were determined. Some of the following methods will be reviewed again briefly in the
following chapters as they become relevant.

Data Acquisition and Pre-processing
Subjects
Two healthy adult females and one healthy male participated in the main experiment,
and one healthy male participated in the control experiment. All subjects had normal or
corrected-to normal vision. All subjects gave written informed consent approved by the
Institutional Review Boards at the University of Minnesota and/or the Medical University
of South Carolina before participating in the study. Each subject completed both vision
and imagery runs.

Experimental Design and Stimuli
The experimental scans were organized into separate 10-minute runs, each an
uninterrupted succession of trials during which whole-brain blood-oxygen level
dependent (BOLD) activity was measured. Runs were of two types: vision runs and
imagery runs. During vision runs stimuli, including an object picture and a cue, were
presented on a screen and viewed by the subjects. During imagery runs object pictures
were not presented and only a cue was shown on the viewing screen. During these runs
subjects instead imagined the cued object pictures (Figure 3.1). Subjects viewed the
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stimulus on a 3M Vikuiti rigid rear projection screen projected on by a NEC NP4000
projector (1024 × 768 resolution and 60Hz). Data acquired during vision runs were used
to estimate visual encoding models. Data acquired during imagery runs were used to
independently estimate imagery encoding models. During all runs, subjects fixated on a
6-letter cue (filling a 1.5° × 0.4° rectangle) at the center of a grey stimulus field (16° ×
16°). Eight brackets with 8 distinct colors framed the stimulus field throughout each run.
Each bracket delineated a different but overlapping portion of the stimulus field (8° × 8°)
within which an object picture might be seen (vision runs) or imagined (imagery runs).
The same framing brackets were visible and unchanging at all times during all runs and
conditions, and therefore contributed no variance in the stimulus. Cues were 6-letter
descriptive abbreviations (e.g., “firtrk” cued a picture of a fire truck, “ababie” cued a
picture of a baby) and always appeared at the same location and with the same
dimensions throughout both run types (Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.1 Experimental Design. Data and procedures for estimating visual encoding models
(vEM, left) and imagery encoding models (iEM, right). Whole-brain fMRI (7T) measured BOLD
activity as subjects viewed or imagined 64 unique object pictures at 8 distinct locations. The color
of the six-letter cue for each stimulus coded a location bounded by a visible bracket. Model
estimation (center) was applied separately to visual and imagery data, resulting in a distinct vEM
and iEM for each voxel. Model prediction accuracy was k-fold cross-validated by computing
Pearson correlation between predicted and measured activities on held-out data.
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Figure 3.2 Experimental Timing. Top: The stimulus displayed on the viewing screen during
vision runs. Second from top: Enlargements of the cues visible during both vision and imagery
runs. Third from top: The display during imagery run. Bottom: Timing of stimulus on/off-set and
inter-stimulus interval (∆t isi ).
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During imagery runs (Figure 3.1 right and Figure 3.2 bottom), subjects were
instructed to fixate on the cue and mentally project the cued object onto the portion of the
visual field framed by the bracket whose color matched the color of the cue. For example,
the cue “firtrk” written in yellow prompted the subject to imagine the firetruck picture in
the upper left corner within the yellow framing brackets. Subjects were instructed to
imagine the object in the correct position for the 2s duration in which the cue was
present. Each imagined object was followed by an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) during
which the 6-letter fixation cue at center was replaced by a dummy cue (“XXXXXX”).
Subjects were instructed to stop imagining the object for the duration of the ISI which
varied randomly from 1 TR (2 seconds) to 𝑗 × 𝑇𝑅 where 𝑗 was sampled from a Poisson
distribution (𝜆 = 0.4; ≈ 2 to 6s).
During the matched vision runs (Figure 3.1 left and Figure 3.2 top), subjects viewed
that same display as during the imagery runs (i.e., the same cues, background, framing
brackets, and ISI) except that the object picture was visually present. Subjects were
instructed to fixate the cue and view the object pictures passively.
Object pictures (Figure 3.3A) were selected from the SUN labeled image collection
(Xiao et al. 2010) and were selected to span the 19 object categories specified in
(Naselaris et al. 2009). Each object was extracted from its background using the object
mask provided by the SUN database. Masks were dilated by 10 pixels.
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Figure 3.3 Details of the stimuli. A) All 64 individual object pictures viewed and imagined
during the experiment. B) An object picture displayed in each of the 8 positions bounded by the
framing brackets. C) A superposition of all 64 objects pictures showing the visual field coverage
of the stimuli.

Eight unique object pictures (single row in Figure 3.3A) were displayed and
imagined during each scanning session (set of runs). Note that subjects therefore had to
remember only 8 object pictures at a time. Prior to each run subjects familiarized
themselves with the experimental stimuli using a self-paced version of the imagery
experiment. Familiarization sessions halted when subjects felt confident that the 8 object
pictures and associated 6-letter cues were committed to memory. These sessions varied in
duration from 20-30 minutes per scanning session.
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Each object picture was displayed or imagined at each of the 8 framed locations
(Figure 3.3B), for a total of 64 unique stimuli per run. Each unique stimuli was also
viewed/imagined twice within a run, for a total 128 stimulus presentations/acts of
imagery per run. Runs were repeated a minimum of two times for vision and two times
for imagery. Repetition of runs allowed us to utilize a BOLD time-series denoising
technique that uses the reoccurring conditions to cross validate parameter fits (Kay,
Rokem, et al. 2013). Over all sessions, runs, object pictures, and positions there were a
total of 512 unique stimuli (each viewed and imagined), at least 2048 stimulus
presentations, and at least 2048 acts of mental imagery, per subject.

MR Acquisition Parameters
7T MRI data was acquired at the Center for Magnetic Resonance Research (CMRR)
at the University of Minnesota. The experimental fMRI runs were collected using a 7T
Siemens Magnetom scanner and a Nova Medical head coil (CP Transmit / 32 channel
receive coil). Whole-brain functional data was acquired with a gradient-echo EPI
sequence at a resolution of 1.6mm3: TR 2000 ms, TE 22.8 ms, FOV 130 × 130, Partial
Fourier 7/8, 70 slices, GRAPPA R=2, multiband acceleration factor 2, anterior-posterior
phase encode, transverse slice orientation.
3T MRI control data was acquired at the Center for Biomedical Imaging (CBI) at the
Medical University of South Carolina. The experimental fMRI runs were collected using
a 3T Siemens Trio TIM scanner and a 32-channel receiver coil array. Whole-brain
functional data was acquired with a gradient-echo EPI sequence at a resolution of 2.5
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mm3: TR 2000 ms, TE 33 ms, FOV 100 x 100, 52 slices, multiband acceleration factor 2,
anterior-posterior phase encode, transverse slice orientation.
Prior to experimental runs we collected a 1-mm T1-weighted whole-brain anatomical
volume (at 7T for subjects in the main experiment and at 3T for the control subject). We
also collected standard GRE fieldmaps at each scanning session for the correction of EPI
spatial distortions (Jezzard & Balaban 1995).

Surface Reconstructions
Structural T1 volumes were skull-stripped and used to obtain surface reconstructions
(Freesurfer). Flatmaps used for displaying results and drawing retinotopic ROIs were
prepared with pycortex (Gao et al. 2015). Briefly, T1-weighted volumes were passed to
Freesurfer’s recon-all (version 6) for cortical reconstruction and segmentation, pial and
white-matter surface rendering, and cortical inflation. We then made manual edits to the
segmentations to ensure optimal surface quality. Digital cuts were made into the inflated
surface using Blender (v2.78) and then processed by pycortex for flattening and
rendering. Functional data to be displayed on surfaces were rigidly aligned to the above
processed structural volumes using FSL FLIRT.

Functional Image Correction and Alignment
Functional scans were corrected and aligned within subject only. For each run, time
series motion correction was performed through rigid alignment of all volumes to the
middle volume (FSL MCFLIRT). Acquired fieldmaps were then used for spatial B0
distortion correction (FSL FUGUE). Functional volumes were temporally resampled to
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correct for slice timing differences (FSL slicetimer). Spatial transformations up to this
pre-processing stage were then concatenated and applied to un-corrected and unregistered volumes to minimize spatial resampling. An average of the time series from
the run with the least amount of absolute movement was selected as the reference image
for rigid alignment between runs (FSL FLIRT). Any residual misalignment was reduced
via non-linear registration of all functional volumes to the same reference image (FSL
FNIRT). Transforms for the last two registrations were concatenated and applied to the
within-scan corrected images.

Time-Series Modeling, Denoising, and Activation Estimation
BOLD time-series modeling for each voxel in the corrected and registered functional
volumes was performed using GLMdenoise (Kay, Rokem, et al. 2013) (Canonical HRF,
visual cortex mask for PC-selecting voxels, noise-pool threshold defined as 99th
percentile of 𝑅 2 values, minimum of 700 voxels with highest 𝑅 2 selected from visual
cortex used to select number of principal components, 100 bootstrapping iterations). For
each voxel this procedure output an estimate of activation amplitude per unique seen
stimulus and an independent estimate of activation amplitude per unique imagined
stimulus. Activation estimates were bootstrapped to obtain confidence intervals.

Region of Interest (ROI) Identification
We conducted independent retinotopic mapping experiments to identify visual areas
V1, V2, V3, V3ab, V4, and LO. We utilized the mapping stimuli and population
receptive field estimation (analyzePRF) technique from Kay et al. (Kay, Winawer, et al.
2013; Dumoulin & Wandell 2008) to construct angle and eccentricity maps for subjects
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1, 3, and control subject 4. Similar retinotopic maps were constructed using a standard
traveling wave approach for subject 2 (Engel et al. 1997). These maps were overlaid onto
flattened cortical surfaces and imported into Inkscape where phase reversals and
eccentricity patterns were used to hand-draw continuous ROI boundaries as described by
Hansen et al. (Hansen et al. 2007). Ventral and dorsal regions were delineated for V1,
V2, and V3. Surface-defined ROIs were then transformed back to functional 3D
volumetric space using pycortex (get_roi_masks function with gm_sampler = “thick”). A
cortical ribbon mask (adopted from Freesurfer’s earlier segmentation) was prepared for
all ROIs.
To identify cortex within the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) functional volumes were
registered to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 1mm3 standard space (FSL FNIRT,
3mm warp resolution). ROI’s were then defined using published probabilistic maps of
ROIs in volumetric standard space (Wang et al. 2015).These probabilistic maps were
thresholded at 10%; any voxel belonging to multiple ROIs under this threshold was
assigned to the ROI for which it had the highest probability of membership. The
registration transform was then inverted to bring these ROIs from standard space back
into individual subjects’ native spaces.

Voxel-wise Encoding Model Design, Estimation, and Analyses of
Parameters
The Feature-Weighted Receptive Field (fwRF) Encoding Model
Imagery encoding models and visual encoding models were estimated using the
feature-weighted receptive field (fwRF) approach that was developed in-house (St-Yves
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& Naselaris 2017). The fwRF is a voxel-wise encoding model meaning that it can be used
to predict activation in response to arbitrary stimuli for each voxel in a functional volume
(summarized in Figure 3.4A). Specifically, the fwRF utilizes both classic receptive fields
and visual feature tuning by defining them as two separable sets of parameters of the
same model. First, the model makes the assumption that a voxel’s activity can be
explained by multiple feature maps, each of which describes the degree to which a
specific feature is present across the visual stimulus, preserving the topology of the visual
field. Secondly, the model assumes that the region that a voxel responds to is relatively
localized and fixed across all feature maps.
For this study feature maps were constructed by convolving Gabor wavelets of
different sizes, orientations, and spatial frequencies with the visual stimuli (note that this
preserves the topology but not necessarily the resolution of the stimulus in native visual
space). Rather than pooling over pixels in a localized region of the stimulus (as the
standard pRF model does) the fwRF model pools over the pixels in a localized region of
feature maps (called the feature pooling field). Feature pooling in this study was adjusted
such that the overall pooling was consistent across all feature maps (of different
resolutions) with respect to a visual field region (the classical receptive field) (see Figure
3.4B). The fwRF objective is to minimize the squared error between the observed data
and the prediction produced by a set of feature weights and receptive field. Feature
weights were optimized for each voxel through stochastic gradient descent and RF size
and locations were optimized through grid search.
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Figure 3.4 The fwRF model. A) Schematic illustration of fwRF model training. Training was
performed independently for vision and imagery using completely independent datasets. First, the
visual stimuli were convolved with complex Gabor wavelets of various spatial frequencies,
orientations, and sizes. The visual stimuli used for both the imagery and visual encoding models
was the same. Feature maps were constructed by taking the magnitude of each complex
convolution. A feature pooling field (f.p.f) is then applied to each feature map. The f.p.f is a
Gaussian function of space that is projected onto each feature map to obtain a scalar output per
feature map. These outputs are then weighted by feature weights (ω1 , … , ωn ) that are, collectively,
a visual feature tuning function. The sum of these feature-weighted outputs is the fwRF model's
predicted activation in response to a stimulus. For each voxel, the sum of squared errors between
the model's predictions and the measured activations in a training set was minimized using
stochastic gradient descent over the feature map weights and a brute-force search over a grid of
receptive field sizes (σRF ) and locations (μx , μy ). For the imagery runs, measured activations
correspond to imagined stimuli; for the vision runs, measured activation correspond to seen stimuli.
B) The feature pooling field size σf.p.f. is constrained by the selected receptive field size σRF and
the pooling field size σp.f. of the feature being pooled over. As a consequence, feature maps with
σp.f. ≥ σRF have zero weights.
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For practical reasons, two versions of the fwRF were estimated for each subject: one
“fine” model fit was performed on the voxels within labeled ROIs only (V ≈ 50K) while
a “coarse” model was fit on whole-brain (all voxels available i.e. V ≈ 300K). The coarse
fits were used to provide a brain-wide view of the model’s prediction accuracy. The fine
model fits offered more precision in model parameter estimates and slightly better
prediction accuracy. Note that both models produced consistent results for the voxels to
which they were both applied.
For the “fine” models the visual feature set consisted of Gabor wavelets at 4
uniformly distributed orientations times 12 spatial frequencies (log-spaced between ω =
0.35 and ω =11.0 deg-1) for a total of 48 features. Gabor wavelets spanned 4 standard
deviations of the Gaussian envelope and were designed to have one cycle per standard
deviation. The fine model utilized a uniform grid of 21 × 21 receptive locations times 12
receptive field sizes (log-spaced between 0.22 and 8.75 degrees of visual angle).
For the “coarse” models, visual feature sets consisted of Gabor wavelets at 4 different
uniformly distributed orientations times 8 spatial frequencies (log-spaced between ω =
0.96 and ω = 8.23 deg-1 for a total of 32 features. The coarse model utilized a uniform
grid of 10 × 10 receptive locations times 6 receptive field sizes (log-spaced between 0.73
and 4.37 degrees of visual angle).

Training and Cross-Validation
The fwRF was applied to vision and imagery datasets independently, ultimately
producing two encoding models for each voxel. Data from the visual runs were used to
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estimate the visual encoding models, while data from the imagery runs were used to
estimate the imagery encoding models. In both cases, the input of the encoding models 𝑠𝑡
during training is the exact visual stimulus that was presented during the visual
experiment (including the cue). All of the following details therefore apply to both
instances of fwRF training.
Feature weights and receptive field parameters were estimated using a 𝑘-fold crossvalidation procedure. To do this the 𝑁total = 512 samples of activation per voxel
(corresponding to the 512 unique object-position pairs) were split into k=16 randomly
selected and nonoverlapping validation subsets (𝑁val = 32). For each fold of crossvalidation, one of these subsets was set aside for validation while the rest (k-1) were used
as model-training sets to estimate a fwRF model for each voxel (the latter group was
further broken up into training and hold out sets to prevent overfitting). The resulting
fwRF models were used to predict the activation of each voxel in response to the held-out
validation subset. This process was repeated k times so that there was a prediction of
activation for all voxels in response to each of the 512 unique object-position pairs. For
the “fine” model the process was repeated 𝑘 = 16 times, resulting in 16 distinct fwRF
models for each voxel. For the “coarse” model the process was repeated 𝑘 = 8 times. For
each voxel, the concatenated 512 activation predictions were compared to the
corresponding measured activation from the brain to obtain a Pearson correlation
coefficient characterizing the overall model prediction accuracy for this voxel (see
bottom of Figure 3.1). Error estimates on prediction accuracy values were obtained by
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sampling 100 times with replacement the 𝑘 models for each voxel and recalculating the
correlation coefficient for each sample.
Estimation of the feature weights for each model was performed using stochastic
gradient descent with a learning rate of 5 × 10-3 and with a batch size of 96 for a
maximum of 100 epochs. For the “fine” model 40% of the training data was held-out as
an early stopping set; for the “coarse” model the hold-out was 50%. Parameter updating
halted early if the held-out loss began to increase. Estimation of the receptive field
location and size was performed by brute-force search over the minimum hold-out loss
reached by all possible candidates on a grid (see Figure 3.4A).
A significance threshold on prediction accuracy (dashed grey lines in Figure 5.2A
and Figure 5.3) was defined as three standard deviations (𝑝 < 0.01) from the mean of a
null distribution over prediction accuracy that assumed no relationship between the
model predictions and measured activities. This null distribution was built through 500
iterations of shuffling the model’s predicted activity over conditions for each voxel and
then measuring the correlation coefficient between this shuffled predicted activity and the
corresponding measured activity for that voxel. Unless otherwise specified, analyses of
receptive field attributes and spatial frequency tuning were applied only to voxels with a
visual or imagery encoding model above this accuracy threshold (Pearson correlation
coefficient ≥ .16).
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Voxel Selection
To ensure that our results did not reflect any response to the slight changes in hue and
shape of the cue with condition, the following procedure was used to identify and discard
any voxel that showed sensitivity to the 6-letter cues during either the imagery or the
visual runs. The visual stimuli used to estimate each fwRF model included both the
object picture and its associated cue. To test for sensitivity to the cue, we calculated
cross-validated prediction accuracy using input stimuli that contained either the cues or
the object pictures only. Voxels for which the cue-only stimuli resulted in abovethreshold prediction accuracy for either the imagery or the vision encoding model were
discarded from any analysis of receptive field attributes of feature tuning. Only voxels for
which the picture-only stimuli resulted in above-threshold prediction accuracy were
retained for receptive field and feature tuning analyses. Error! Reference source not
found. enumerates the number of voxels per ROI and subject that satisfied these
conditions. In Figure 5.4B, we retain voxels for which either the visual (top) or the
imagery (bottom) encoding models had above-threshold predication accuracy. In Figure
5.4C-E we retain only voxels for which both the visual and imagery encoding models had

above-threshold prediction accuracy.
Figure 3.5 shows receptive fields of the discarded cue-responsive voxels. As

expected, receptive fields tend be small and are concentrated at the center of the visual
field where the cue was displayed.
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Table 3.1 Number of selected voxels per ROI per subject. Each cell contains three rows of
numbers. The top row gives the total number of voxels in the specified ROI. The middle row
gives the number of voxels with a visual encoding model that exceeds the prediction accuracy
threshold (left, blue) and the number of voxels with an imagery encoding model that exceeds
threshold (right, orange). The bottom row (dark green) gives the number of voxels with a visual
and imagery encoding model that both exceed the prediction accuracy threshold.
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Figure 3.5 Receptive fields of removed voxels with cue responsivity. Circle plots showing the

average raw receptive fields (locations and relative sizes) corresponding to voxels from
each area that were well predicted by the cue and subsequently removed from further
analyses. Each ROI (row) is partitioned by hemisphere (“L” = left and “R” = right),
and/or dorsal (“d”) and ventral (“v”). Circle radius is one standard deviation of the
corresponding Gaussian envelopes. As expected, the discarded voxels had small receptive fields
centered on the location of the cue.
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Receptive Field Size and Location
As described above, for each voxel we fit k = 16 independent visual encoding models,
and k = 16 independent imagery encoding models, each corresponding to a different
training/validation split of the data. Thus, for each voxel we obtain 16 different estimates
of receptive field size and location. Results on differences in the location Figure 5.6C-D
and size Figure 5.6A-B between imagery and visual receptive were obtained by
repeatedly sampling these estimates.
To construct the plots in Figure 5.6C-D we sampled 1000 pairs of imagery and visual
receptive field parameters at random from the k = 16 “fine” encoding models available
for each voxel. Lines in Figure 5.6D show the average shift (over all samples) in
receptive field location of individual voxels from vision to imagery. Values in Figure
5.6C show the average over all sampled pairs and voxels in each ROI, and the error bars
for each subject indicate one standard deviation of the sampling distribution and the
yellow shading shows the same for combined subject data. Similarly Figure 5.6B shows
the mean and one standard deviation of the differences between imagery and visual
receptive field sizes. Illustrations of receptive fields in Figure 5.6A and Figure 3.5 show
average receptive field locations and sizes over samples for individual voxels.
To obtain the significance estimates displayed for all receptive field size and location
results in Figure 5.6 we tested the hypothesis of a non-zero mean difference between
imagery and visual receptive field parameters against the null hypothesis of no mean
difference. To construct the null distribution we performed the same sampling process as
above with the addition of randomly assigning the “imagery” or “vision” designation to
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each sampled value for each voxel in the indicated ROI. We then calculated the mean
difference between the receptive field parameters between each group. This process was
repeated 1000 times, resulting in a histogram of differences in mean receptive field
parameters for each ROI. The region outside the red shaded area in Figure 5.6B-C
indicates values at significance level p < 0.01 for combined subject data. For each subject
and point individually, the observed values with p < 0.01 are indicated by a black asterisk
on the mean observed value.

Spatial Frequency Tuning
Tuning is a reflection of the relative preference of a voxel for a certain type of
explanation (i.e. certain parts of the model). For example, if a voxel’s model was to
crucially dependent on a certain set of features such that its prediction dropped
significantly whenever the weights associated with those features were set to zero, then
we would say that the voxel is tuned to these features. Such a dropout procedure (St-Yves
& Naselaris 2017) was used to determine all spatial frequency tuning shown and
analyzed in this study. To determine tuning for a given voxel to a specific frequency, we
set all weights to 0 except those belonging to feature maps generated using Gabor
wavelets of that frequency. We then calculated the Pearson correlation 𝜌 between the
activation predicted by the model with only those weights and the measured activation.
The value of 𝜌 was calculated for each spatial frequency and can be interpreted as a
percentage of variance explained (David & Gallant 2005) by that frequency. In order to
compare voxels to each other, we normalized these frequency tuning curves to make
them independent of the total variance explained. Thus, the tuning function was defined
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as the square of 𝜌 for each specific frequency divided by the sum of the square of
these 𝜌's over all frequencies Figure 5.4A (top 3 plots show examples for individual
voxels). Thus, two voxels that show the same tuning profile but different maximum
explained variance would have the same tuning curve. A tuning value of 0 for a given
spatial frequency means that the associated feature maps explained none of the variance
in activation across stimuli; a tuning value of 1 means it uniquely explained all of the
variance.
Averaging the tuning distributions of all voxels within a ROI produces a tuning
distribution at the level of ROI. Averages (dots in Figure 5.4A, bottom and Figure 5.4,
Figure 5.6B-C) and error estimates were obtained by sampling with replacement 100
times the 16 validation subsets and associated encoding models for each voxel and then
averaging across all iterations and voxels in a single ROI.
Consistent with previous studies (Henriksson et al. 2008), ROI-level tuning curves
were found to empirically obey a log-Gaussian relationship. We thus performed nonlinear
regressions to fit curves of this form to each tuning curve (curves Figure 5.4A-C). This
fit was used to estimate the peak frequency values of the tuning curves (Figure 5.4D) and
its shift (Figure 5.4E). The error estimate on the difference in peak frequency between
imagery and vision tuning curves takes into account the uncertainty in the fitting
procedure as well as the uncertainty in the ROI tuning points.
To obtain significance estimates for Figure 5.4E we tested the hypothesis of a nonzero difference between imagery and visual peak spatial frequencies against the null
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hypothesis of no difference between peak frequencies. To construct the null distribution
of peak frequency shift, we randomly shuffled the “vision” or “imagery” designation of
voxel-wise tuning and calculated the mean frequency shift 1000 times. The region
outside the red shaded area in Figure 5.4E indicates values with p < 0.01 for combined
subject data. For each subject and point individually, the points with p < 0.01 are
indicated by a black asterisk.

Stimulus Identification
An important measure of the validity of an encoding model is how well it can
discriminate target stimuli that correspond to the measured activity from other “lure”
stimuli, or in other words, how well it can decode imagined images (Naselaris et al.
2014). Here we used pairwise “hits” as a measure of identification accuracy. A “hit”
occurs when the measured voxel activity pattern for the cued target is more correlated
with the predicted activity pattern for that same target than the predicted activity pattern
for a non-cued lure target. Note that any visual stimuli (not just the ones used in the
present study) could be used to build the lure set of images, just so long as they could be
fed to the encoding models to produce a prediction. However, for simplicity we selected
our lure images from stimuli seen in the experiment. Identification accuracy for a given
target stimulus is the percentage of hits accumulated across all lure images.
We performed two distinct types of identification. Position identification was used to
determine if the encoding models successfully captured the way that object position was
encoded in population activity (i.e. identify which of the 8 positions an object was
imagined). Similarly, object identification was used to determine if the encoding models
52

successfully captured the way that specific objects, independent of position, were
encoded in population activity (i.e. identify which one of the 64 different objects was
imagined). For both types of identification, the cue was not included as part of either the
target or lure stimuli. Thus, model predictions did not include any information about the
cue (and I again emphasize that cue-responsive voxels were not included in this analysis,
see section on Voxel Selection).
Both identification of locations and of objects is performed in two parts. First, half of
the activation samples (256) for each voxel were randomly selected (but balanced such
that all locations or objects were represented in each set). This half of the samples was
used to estimate a cross-validated prediction accuracy score (Pearson correlation
coefficient) for each voxel. These scores were used to rank-order all voxels from low to
high accuracy and subsequently split them into groups of 500. The second part involved
using each group of 500 voxels to calculate identification accuracy on the remaining half
of the activation samples (256). In order to factor out the contribution of position during
object identification and vice-versa, the activity patterns of samples that corresponded to
the same identification target (a position or an object) were concatenated across either all
64 objects (for position identification) or all 8 positions (for object identification). This
produced 8 series of concatenated voxel predictions and measured values for location
identification, and 64 for object identification. We then evaluated the correlation matrix
between all prediction series and measured series (see Figure 3.6 for an example of an
object identification matrix). The percentage of identification “hits” is then simply the
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fraction of entries for which the diagonal elements have a greater value than the other
entries in the row corresponding to the “lure” predictions.
To produce the curves shown in Figure 4.2, the previous procedure is repeated 100
times for overlapping brackets of decreasing voxel validation accuracy (i.e., the top
bracket contains the 500 voxels with the most accurate encoding model predictions, the
second bracket contains the voxels with the 251st - 750th most accurate, etc.). Values on
the x-axes of plots in Figure 4.2 give the largest (over the 100 repeats) of the smallest
validation accuracy within each bracket. The standard error captures the variation of the
identification “hits” percentage within each bracket.
To estimate the level of identification due to chance, the real identities of the
locations (objects) underwent 5 shuffling per each of the 100 repeats discussed above and
a common histogram was built from these 500 values for each bracket. Chance level for
hits, the center of the null distribution, is always 50%. The region outside the grey
shading near the bottom of plots in Figure 4.2 correspond to identification score with
significance level p < 0.01.
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Figure 3.6 Object Identification Matrix. An example object identification matrix for one subject
where each entry corresponds to the degree of correlation between the voxel activations predicted
by the imagery encoding model for a single object picture (concatenated across all 8 positions)
and the measured voxel activations in response to imagining the same object picture (darker
orange is a stronger correlation). A “hit” is then counted every time the diagonal entry is higher
than another “lure” entry along the same row.
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Chapter 4 : Validation of the Imagery Encoding Model
Specific Aim 1: Build voxel-wise imagery encoding models. Hypothesis: imagery
encoding models, like visual encoding models, can be successfully measured from fMRI
data, used to predict brain activity to new imagined stimuli, and used to decode the
position and content of the imagined stimuli.

Overview and Rationale
In the context of visual neuroscience, encoding models are models that attempt to
capture the transformations that turn seen pictures into evoked brain activity. In human
neuroimaging, voxel-wise encoding models can be built by examining the relationship
between changes in visual features seen by a subject and systematic changes in individual
voxel activity. Importantly, these encoding models make predictions about how a voxel
will respond to a given input/stimuli and the model is in fact trained by tweaking its
parameters so that it makes predictions that are closer and closer to the observed activity
of that voxel. Once the appropriate parameters (those that lead to good predictions) are
learned, those parameters can be used to infer “what” or “where” in the visual world a
given voxel is tuned to. In other words, voxel-wise encoding models can be used to
estimate the way in which visual features are encoded in individual voxels during a
certain task. For the task of vision, such models are now routinely estimated (Kay et al.
2008; Naselaris et al. 2009; St-Yves & Naselaris 2017; Kay, Winawer, et al. 2013). For
example, a relatively simple and popular encoding model is the population receptive field
(pRF) model (Dumoulin & Wandell 2008) which estimates receptive fields (RFs), areas
of the visual field that, when a stimulus is presented within it, evokes increased activity in
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a neural unit such as a neuron. The pRF model estimates RFs for populations of neurons
(i.e. a voxel) by presenting subjects with a high contrast stimuli that sweeps across the
visual field as a bar or expands as a ring. The parameters of a given voxel’s receptive
field, specifically its size and location, are then adjusted until its prediction of a voxel’s
activity evoked by the stimuli closely matches that of the measured voxel activity evoked
by that same stimuli.
The relationship that we have derived between vision and imagery (that imagery
activity can also be expressed as a function of s) suggests that we should be able to
recover imagery encoding models in the same manner as with visual encoding models
only with a slightly different conditioning. That is, instead of viewing s, imagine s (see
Equation 6). These encoding models could in turn be used to probe the hypothesized
differences between vision and imagery. In the following chapter I give a brief overview
of the experimental design that we implemented to vary visual features in imagined
visual space while measuring the corresponding changes in fMRI voxel-wise activation
patterns, and how this data was used to build an imagery encoding model (iEM)
independent of a visual task
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Methods
We measured whole-brain fMRI BOLD activity as three participants viewed and then
imagined previously memorized object pictures in 1 of 8 different positions within the
visual field. Each picture was associated with a six-letter cue and subjects familiarized
themselves with picture-cue pairs prior to scanning. During vision runs, subjects were
presented with both the cue (on which they fixated) and the picture in one of the positions
while they passively viewed. During imagery runs, subjects were presented with the cue
alone on which they fixated while imagining the matching picture. The color of the cue
corresponded to the color of 1 of 8 brackets (each framing a portion of the stimulus field)
and indicated the location in which the subject was to imagine the picture. For example,
the cue “firtrk” written in blue means imagine the fire truck in the bottom left corner
within the blue bracket. It is important to note that the colored brackets remained constant
throughout all runs and the color-coded fixation-cues appeared in both conditions so that
the only difference between vision and imagery conditions was the complete absence of
the object picture during the imagery runs. The only source of variance during the
imagery runs would therefore be the small changes in color and composition of the 6letter cue at the center (overall size of the cue remained constant) and importantly, the
imagined image.
To characterize the tuning properties of voxel activity during imagery, we used an
encoding model estimation procedure developed in house: the feature weighted receptive
field (fwRF) model (St-Yves & Naselaris 2017). The fwRF model is capable of
describing not only the location and extent of receptive fields but also tuning to any
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feature that can be extracted from the stimuli, such as spatial frequency. This model has
been shown to recover receptive field properties and tuning functions consistent with
known organizational principles of the visual cortex. The fwRF was used to estimate
voxel-wise visual encoding models from the visual runs and imagery encoding models
from the imagery runs. Encoding models specified tuning to spatial frequency and a
receptive field location and size for each voxel. Each voxel therefore had two
independent models, a visual encoding model and an imagery encoding model. Any
voxel sensitive to the cues was discarded. All experimental runs performed with subjects
1–3 were also performed on a 4th control subject (S4) where eye tracking was measured
(using a SR Research EyeLink 1000 eye-tracker) to confirm that any results obtained in
relation to the stimuli (whose location was intentionally manipulated) could not be
accounted for by eye movement. For more detailed information on the experimental
design, data acquisition and processing as well the specifics of the fwRF model training
see Chapter 3 on Experimental Methods.

Results
Analysis of Encoding Model Performance
A first and crucial test of the imagery encoding model (iEM) is to show that it can
successfully explain variance in signal across mental images that were not used to train
the model. To do this we performed a k-fold cross-validation analysis (see Methods for
details). Briefly, the trained imagery models were used to generate predictions of voxel
activity in response to held-out imagined pictures sets. The validation was then scored as
the Pearson correlation coefficient (CC) between the predicted and measured activities
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during imagery for each voxel. As a reference point, this was also done for the visual
encoding models (vEMs) using held-out data from the vision runs. Therefore, each voxel
had a validation score for the iEM and a validation score for the vEM. Figure 4.1 shows
the cross-validation prediction accuracy for each voxel from the vEM (top row) and iEM
(middle row) mapped onto a flattened cortical surface of each subject, while the bottom
most row shows the distribution of iEM scores (orange) and vEM scores (blue) for all
voxels as well as their joint distribution (green). All voxels falling above the horizontal
grey line reached the significance threshold set on prediction accuracy (Pearson
correlation coefficient ≥ .16, 𝑝 < 0.01 see methods for how this was calculated). The
iEM was able to predict activation in response to imagined pictures well above
significance for many voxels in all visual cortical areas considered here (see Error!
Reference source not found. for count of significant voxels by visual area for all
subjects).
To further establish the validity of the iEM we performed model-based identification.
That is, how well the model can pick out the cued imagined stimulus from other “lure”
stimuli using predictions of activity patterns across voxels. We distinguish between two
measures of identification performance: position identification (i.e. which of the 8
positions the object was shown) and object identification (i.e. which one of the 64
different objects was shown, regardless of its position). Most importantly, object
identification must rely on some feature(s) of the object present in the stimulus, not just
the area of the visual field that it happens to occupy, and therefore its success can rule out
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certain confounds (such as spatial attention). In both cases, we used the pairwise accuracy
(“hits”) to represent identification accuracy.
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Figure 4.1 Cross validation accuracy of encoding models. Prediction accuracy (colorbar)
of the visual encoding model (vEM; top row) and imagery encoding model (iEM; middle
row) mapped on the flattened cortical surface for each subject. Bottom: joint histogram
(green) and marginal histogram of prediction accuracy for imagery (orange) and visual
(blue) encoding models across all voxels for subjects 1-3. The iEM makes accurate
predictions of imagery activity (Pearson correlation ≥ 0.16, 𝑝 < .01; dashed grey lines)
in all subjects.
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Briefly, identification was assessed in groups of 500 voxels at a time, and for every
cued target (an imagined object or position) a pattern of evoked activity was measured in
the brain across all the voxels in that group. A hit was counted whenever the measured
group pattern for a cued target was more correlated with the predicted group pattern for
that same cued target than for some other non-cued “lure” target (see Figure 3.6 for
example matrix of correlations). Predictions of activity patterns made by the imagery
encoding models were accurate enough to identify position of (Figure 4.2, top) and
object in (Figure 4.2, bottom) the imagined stimuli. This demonstrates that subjects were
imagining the cued objects as instructed. Moreover, groups that contained voxels with
higher prediction accuracies performed better identification. This suggests that the
success of the model depends, to a degree, on the object-picture contained in the stimuli.
Accurate identification of imagined objects would not be possible if variation in spatial
attention, eye position or visual cues were the sole determinants of prediction accuracy.
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Figure 4.2 Identification of imagined stimuli. Model performance in identifying the
correct position (top) and object picture (bottom) of the imagined stimuli for each ROI in
each subject. Curves show percentage of correct pairwise identification (colored shading
indicates ± 𝑆𝐸; gray shading indicates statistical significance threshold of 𝑝 < .01
(permutation test) for subpopulations of 500 voxels in visual area. Ordering along x-axis
is by lowest prediction accuracy of all voxels in each subpopulation.
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Analysis of the Learned Encoding Model Parameters
The goal of aim 2 is to measure changes in encoded features across the visual cortex
from vision to imagery. In order for this comparison to have meaning, we must first make
sure that our model is assigning receptive field and tuning parameters that reflect known
functional structure of the visual cortex during vision. Cortical maps of receptive field
size, receptive field location and peak spatial frequency derived from visual encoding
models (Figure 4.3, left) are consistent with maps observed in many previous studies,
e.g., (Dumoulin & Wandell 2008; Kay et al. 2015; St-Yves & Naselaris 2017; Hansen et
al. 2007). Namely, receptive field size increased and spatial frequency preference
decreased with distance from foveal representations, and reversals in receptive field
visual angle occurred over the boundaries between ROIs (note that ROI boundaries were
drawn using a separate set of standard retinotopy mapping experiments). Interestingly,
for every subject, the imagery encoding models also exhibit reversals at the boundaries of
visual ROIs (Figure 4.3, top right) that are consistent with visual organization. Plots of
visual receptive field locations show expected relationships between visual field
quadrants and ventral/dorsal, left and right cortical hemispheres (Figure 4.4).
Additionally, visual encoding models reproduce expected size-eccentricity relationships
(Figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.3 Anatomical layout of encoding model attributes.Visual angle (top row),
average eccentricity (middle row), and spatial frequency tuning (bottom row) during
vision (first column) and imagery (second column) shown on a flatted cortical surface for
subject 1, displaying the retinotopic organization recovered by the encoding models.
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Figure 4.4 Visual receptive fields. Circle plots showing the average raw receptive fields
(locations and relative sizes) corresponding to a subset of voxels from each area during
vision. Each ROI (row) is partitioned by hemisphere (“L” = left and “R” = right), and/or
dorsal (“d”) and ventral (“v”) position in order to demonstrate specificity of model
receptive field properties by quadrant of visual field. The dashed lines delineate the four
quadrants of the visual field and the black hatched areas fill in the quadrant or side one
would expect to see a concentration of receptive field locations (given known retinotopic
organization of the human visual cortex).
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Figure 4.5 Size-eccentricity relationships. The assigned visual receptive field size as a
function of the assigned receptive field eccentricity for voxels from each ROI. In line
with known organizational properties of the human visual cortex, this relationship
becomes steeper with ascent of the visual hierarchy.
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Control for Potential Eye-Movement Confounds
As is shown above, the prediction of the imagery encoding models were accurate
enough to identify imagined object pictures independently of their location (Figure 4.2).
This result in itself can rule out any confound due to subtle eye movements in the
direction of the imagined scenes. However, to demonstrate this directly, we ran our
experiment with a fourth control subject while tracking the subject’s eye movements. We
estimated and then validated imagery encoding models for this subject, obtaining results
comparable to those obtained for subjects 1-3 (Figure 4.6). The following steps were
taken to show that the subject did not have biased eye movement which might explain
these imagery encoding model results.
First, to confirm that the eye-tracker read-out was showing the correct relative
location of the eyes fixation within the visual field, we ran an extra test run (in addition to
standard calibration that was performed at the start of each run) in which a target dot
appeared in 1 of 9 known positions spanning the area in which the experimental pictures
were shown. The subject was instructed to fixate on the target as it appeared. Figure
4.7A shows that the location of measured eye fixations (colored points) overlapped with
the location of the target (marked with an X). Eye fixations were then measured during
each vision and imagery run. As demonstrated by the example imagery run in Figure
4.7B, the measured fixations were not systematically shifted relative to the different
locations that the subject was instructed to imagine the object pictures.
Next, to account for any overt eye movements that were not observable but still
systematically varied with the stimuli, we created a simple linear model that attempted to
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predict brain activity using eye fixations as input. For each run (n = 21) the simple linear
model was trained on three-quarters of the data, where the target was the GLM beta
weights assigned to a given condition (a picture and location) and the inputs were the x
and y of the eye fixations during that condition. The resulting model weights were used to
predict the beta values of the remaining left-out conditions (while taking care that this
validation group had 2 of each position). These predictions were compared to the
measured betas from the brain activity, giving a correlation coefficient (ρ) for each voxel.
The flatmap in Figure 4.7C shows the average run performance score (ρ) for the eyefixation model for each voxel. The scale is the same as those shown in main in Figure
4.1 and Figure 4.6, demonstrating that there are no areas in which eye fixations have
prediction power. Finally, to ensure that the above eye-fixation model failed because
there were no systematic biases in eye fixations, rather than failing due some other
inherent issue of the model, we created “synthetic” eye fixations that varied in sync with
changes in the position of the stimulus. When given this fabricated and systematicallybiased data, the model performed quite well (Figure 4.7D) in the visual cortex, showing
that results in Figure 4.7C were due to a lack of overt biases in eye movement that might
account for our main results. This further highlights the importance of eye tracking and
other controls (i.e. the image identification) for potential confounds.
Taken together, these results show that the subject fixated at the center of the visual
field as instructed, no matter the position of the imagined stimulus, that there was no
evident systematic bias in eye fixations related to position of stimulus, and that even with
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eye movements controlled for, we still recovered the same imagery encoding model
validation results that were observed in subjects 1–3 (Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6 Cross validation accuracy of encoding models and stimulus identification for
control subject with eye-tracking. Results are displayed in a similar fashion as Figure 4.1
and Figure 4.2 to demonstrate that data acquired at 3T with eye-tracking replicates the
finding of the three subjects in the main experiment. A) Validation accuracy during
imagery as a function of the validation accuracy during vision for each voxel
(hexbinned). Marginal plots show the individual distributions of model validation for
vision (blue) and imagery (orange). The red lines indicate the validation accuracy
threshold, where the lower-right quadrant corresponds to voxels that are well predicted
exclusively during vision while the upper-left quadrant correspond to voxels that are well
predicted exclusively during imagery. The upper-right quadrant corresponds to voxels
predicted in both modalities. Visual B) and imagery C) prediction accuracy plotted on the
flattened cortical surface. Darker colors indicate higher prediction accuracy. D) Modelbased identification of imagined stimulus position accuracy from a subpopulation of 500
voxels within each visual area plotted against the lowest prediction accuracy within that
subpopulation of voxels. E) Same as in (D) but with identification of imagined stimulus
picture content. In both cases, the gray shaded area represents one standard deviation of
the distribution of identification accuracy due to chance. The colored-shaded area around
each curve correspond to one standard deviation of the accuracy estimate.
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Figure 4.7 Eye-tracking control results. A) Eye-tracking calibration results
demonstrating that the eye-tracker was accurately tracking eye fixations. Xs mark the
positions within the visual field the target appeared (each location in a different color)
during an eye-tracking calibration test. The colored circles indicate the location of the
subject’s fixation as measured by the eye-tracker, each colored to match the X marking
the position of the target during that given fixation. B) Example eye fixations during the
experiment demonstrating that the subject successfully fixated at center with no
observable biases toward the location of the imagined picture. Plots show all fixations for
all conditions in a sample imagery run separated by location of stimulus. The colored
brackets are the same as was present for all imagery and vision runs. The color of the
fixation points (as well as the relative location of the plot in which it appears) correspond
to the position in which the picture occurred during that fixation. Center plot shows the
center of mass of each group of fixations (color matches those in the other 8 plots) plotted
together and zoomed in to 160x160 pixels to show their relative location in respect to
each of the other positions. C) Flatmap showing the prediction performance of a linear
model attempting to use eye fixations to predict brain responses to different stimulus
positions. Scale is the same as those shown in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.6, demonstrating
that eye fixations had no prediction power. D) Results that would have been obtained had
there been systematic biases in eye movement. Prediction accuracy results when the eyefixation model was given synthetic eye movements that varied in sync with the cued
position of the imagined object picture. In this case the model performed quite well,
ensuring that there was not an issue with the structure of the model itself, but that a total
absence of systematic eye movements was underlying the lack of prediction power in (C).
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Interpretation and Discussion
The iEM is the first instance of a feature encoding model estimated directly from
mental imagery: previous studies examining encoded features in imagery used models
trained on visual data and only tested on imagery (Naselaris et al. 2014; Senden et al.
2019). The iEM is built solely from fMRI data collected during mental imagery and is
entirely independent from visual encoding model that we have built here for comparison.
Our experimental design allowed us to remove virtually all retinal variance so that we
could isolate the neural responses evoked from changes happening in the imagined visual
space. Even with the only source of variance coming from internally generated imagery,
the model was able to learn how to accurately predict voxel activity and to decode the
content and location of new imagined stimuli in a manner similar to the established visual
encoding model. We have thus demonstrated the feasibility and utility of the iEM as a
novel tool for investigating mental images. These findings license us to use the iEM to
directly infer the features that have been encoded during imagery across the visual
hierarchy. The follow chapter explores the parameters of the imagery and visual encoding
models and tests for differences in the encoding of imagined and seen stimuli.
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Chapter 5 : Signatures of Inference in a Generative Model:
Shifts in Properties from Vision to Imagery
Specific Aim 2: Determine if signatures of inference in a generative model can be
observed during mental imagery in the human brain. Hypothesis: (1) tuning to imagined
features in lower visual areas will more closely resemble tuning to seen features in higher
areas and (2) a gradient in this distortional effect that increases with hierarchical distance
below the reactivated area, demonstrating key signatures of inference that follow from
our formulation of mental imagery as inference in an internal generative model.

Overview and Rationale
In Chapters 2 and 3, I laid out the theoretical and technical tools needed to build
encoding models, and in Chapter 4 I established that such models can be constructed
from brain data during imagery alone and that these models contain meaningful
information about the features encoded during mental imagery. In this chapter, I describe
how we used these tools to explore how vision and imagery compare and how this varies,
if at all, across visual areas.
Following the relationships described in Chapter 2, if the HGM is a good model for
both forms of visual experiences then we expect to see a gradient of increasing distortions
moving down the levels of the visual hierarchy whereby receptive field and tuning
properties of imagery shift away from vision properties for that level, and towards the
vision properties of the source (clamped) area. Also note that the echo effect should only
cause a distortion in all areas of the hierarchy below the clamped stage. Because of the
assumed lossless reactivation of the clamped stage and the structure of the hierarchy
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where each stage only “sees” the activity of the stage directly above or below it, inference
will proceed above the clamped level exactly as it does during vision. Therefore, all areas
above the clamped stage will converge to an activation state during imagery that is
indistinguishable from vision, and increasing distortional effects will be seen below the
clamped level. If such patterns between vision and imagery do exist we should be able to
detect them using encoding models built and tested in Chapter 4.
The specific features one would expect to find encoded druing mental imagery then
follow from our hypothesis combined with the known organizational principles of
encoded features during vision across the visual cortex. During vision, the types of
features encoded in higher-level areas in the human visual hierarchy tend to be more
abstract and of lower resolution relative to lower-level visual areas (Figure 5.1, left). For
example, high-level areas respond preferentially to low spatial frequencies and are tuned
to large portions of the visual cortex (i.e. they have large receptive fields), while lowlevel areas respond preferentially to high spatial frequencies and have small precise
receptive fields for working out high resolution details (Henriksson et al. 2008; Dumoulin
& Wandell 2008; Kay, Winawer, et al. 2013; Grill-Spector et al. 2018).
Therefore, we expect to find increasing divergence in such properties moving down
the visual hierarchy whereby imagery receptive fields become relatively larger and more
foveal and imagery spatial frequency preferences become relatively decreased (Figure
5.1, right).
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Figure 5.1 Hypothesized changes in receptive field and tuning properties. Schematic
illustrating the change in resolution and encoded features (such as receptive field size
and spatial frequency preference) during vision (blue) with ascension of the visual
hierarchy. We hypothesize that at and below the clamped area, the features encoded
during imagery (orange) will more closely resemble those of the clamped area during
vision, resulting in a loss of resolution in the lower, more detail-oriented layers.
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Methods
Detailed descriptions of how the imagery and visual encoding models were built from
the fMRI BOLD signal can be found in Chapter 2. Both encoding models specified a
separate receptive field location and size as well as spatial frequency tuning for each
voxel (see Figure 4.3 for an example of the retinotopic organization of these estimates).
In order to assess how the encoding model attributes changed from vision to imagery
across the visual hierarchy we defined regions of interest (ROIs) within the visual cortex
for each subject. This was done using separate retinotopic mapping runs and standard
probabilistic topographic maps. Differences between vision and imagery in terms of
model accuracy, SNR, spatial frequency tuning, receptive field size and location were
then calculated for each ROI in each subject.

Results
Imagery Encoding Model Prediction Accuracy and Signal-to-Noise Exhibit Graded
Attenuation Across Hierarchical Levels.
If during imagery an activity pattern in one visual area is clamped to an expected
visual activity pattern, we should expect prediction accuracy of imagery and visual
encoding models to be close to parity in this area. This was true in intraparietal sulcus
(IPS), a collection of visual areas at the highest level of processing considered here
(Figure 5.2A and Figure 5.3). Relative prediction accuracy of the imagery encoding
model decreased with descent toward primary visual cortex (V1). This gradient is
highlighted by noting that the slope of purple line (the best linear fit of iEM to vEM)
approaches the line of parity (iEM accuracy = vEM accuracy) from low to high areas.
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The distance from parity (slope of fitted line – 1; less negative numbers indicating
stronger similarity) is plotted for each ROI and each subject in Figure 5.2B. The gradient
in relative encoding model prediction accuracy is most likely due to the matched gradient
in relative signal-to-noise (SNR; Figure 5.2C). The attenuation of SNR during imagery
in the brain tracked an attenuation in signal amplitude (Figure 5.2D). Interestingly, this
finding is in line with the hierarchical formulation of a generative model, as a loss of
signal would be expected with each transformation taking the activation from the
clamped level to lower levels. Noise was uniformly reduced during imagery at all
processing levels and for all subjects (Figure 5.2E), a result that could be a consequence
of clamping an additional stage during imagery which would effectively reduce the
number of random variables in the system and therefore reduce noise. This prediction
accuracy and SNR gradient serves as the first indication that the relationship between
imagery and vision varies systematically across the visual cortex in line with the echo
hypothesis.
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Figure 5.2 Relative prediction accuracy of imagery encoding models (iEM) across visual areas.
(A) joint histogram (green) and marginal histogram of prediction accuracy for imagery (orange)
and visual (blue) encoding models for indicated area (subject 1 only; ordering of visual areas
follows (Markov et al. 2013). Purple line shows slope (γ) of best linear fit of iEM to vEM
prediction accuracy. Inflated brain surface map shows relative prediction accuracy (2d colormap)
of the iEM and vEM. (B) Difference from parity (γ -1) for each area. (C) Median signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) for imagery activity relative to visual activity. (D) Relative signal (𝑆; i.e., activation
amplitude) and (E) noise (𝑁).
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Figure 5.3 Relative prediction Accuracy for subjects 2 and 3. Format as in Figure
5.2.
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Spatial Frequency Preference During Mental Imagery is Reduced Relative to Vision in LowLevel Visual Areas
The theory predicted that spatial frequency preference during imagery should
decrease relative to visual spatial frequency preference with descent from the clamped
level toward V1. Such decreases in spatial frequency preference during imagery relative
to vision were in fact observed (Figure 5.4). Unlike encoding model prediction accuracy,
loss of SNR in early visual areas cannot account for these effects. In other words, it is not
the case that the model automatically assigns lower spatial frequency preferences to
noisier voxels potentially leading to the observed shift in tuning for imagery. Rather than
being somehow inherently linked to low frequencies, noisy voxels instead exhibit flat
turning curves across all areas for both imagery and vision (dashed curves in Figure 5.5).
In order to demonstrate the generality of the tuning shift phenomenon, we considered
two different “spatial scales”: overall ROI population tuning shift and voxel-wise tuning
shift. In the population shift, an overlapping but not necessarily identical group of voxels
may be used (i.e. mean tuning of all the voxels in V1 that are well predicted during vision
vs. mean tuning of all the voxels in V1 that are well predicted during imagery), while the
voxel-wise shift can only be assessed in voxels that were well predicted by both vision
and imagery (i.e. mean of shifts from vision to imagery within voxels). The two
perspectives are indicated by the inset Venn diagrams in Figure 5.4B-D (individual
shading of orange or blue circle indicate population tuning, and shading of the overlap in
green indicate voxel-wise tuning) and can be linked to changes in activation amplitude
during imagery in response to different spatial frequencies. If during imagery the
amplitude decays uniformly across all neurons and features, it may be possible to see a
81

tuning shift at the level of ROI (already low activations during vision could drop low
enough during imagery to have voxels removed from the imagery tuning average), but we
would not expect to see any tuning shifts at the level of an individual voxel. Yet if the
amplitude decay during imagery “spares” specific populations of neurons, we would
expect to see tuning shifts at both the population level and the individual voxel level. As
is shown in Figure 5.4B and C the spatial frequency tuning shift from vision to imagery
is seen at both spatial scales. This is consistent with selective neuronal population
changes in early visual areas leading to shifts toward the frequency tuning of the clamped
area. All subsequent panels and analyses use the voxel-wise population.

Receptive Field Location and Size are Altered During Imagery Relative to Vision in LowLevel Visual Areas
Another predicted effect of the echo transformation is that imagery receptive fields
should be increasingly dilated and displaced toward the fovea relative to visual receptive
fields with descent toward V1. In V1, imagery receptive fields were larger (Figure
5.6A,B) and more foveal (Figure 5.6C,D) relative to vision for each subject. Consistent
with our theory, the evidence for differences between imagery and visual receptive field
attributes weakened with ascent toward high-level visual areas.
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Figure 5.4 Differences in spatial frequency tuning between vision and imagery. Differences in
spatial frequency tuning between vision and imagery. (A) Visual (blue) and imagery (orange)
spatial frequency tuning curves for single voxels sampled from V1 and V3ab and population
tuning curves for V1 (bottom). (B) Top: Population tuning curves during vision for all voxels in
the indicated area that have an accurate vEM. Bottom: Population tuning curves during imagery
for voxels that have an accurate iEM. Populations in top (blue circle in Venn diagram) and
bottom (orange circle) plots are overlapping but not identical. (C) Population tuning curves for all
voxels in the indicated area that have an accurate vEM and iEM. All subsequent panels use this
population. (D) Peak spatial frequency of tuning curves in (C). (E) Difference between peak
spatial frequency during imagery and vision.
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Figure 5.5 Spatial frequency tuning curves for all ROIs and subjects. Spatial frequency tuning
curves for all ROIs and subjects. Plots show the average tuning curves in each ROI in S1-3 for
vision (blue) and imagery (orange). Solid lines represent the tuning of all voxels with a prediction
accuracy above a threshold while dotted lines represent the tuning curves of all voxels below
threshold (i.e., voxels for which either the imagery or vision encoding model gave poor
predictions). This demonstrates that our modeling procedure does not induce a bias toward low
frequency preferences for voxels with substantial unexplained variance. Rather, for such voxels
the modeling procedure produces flat spatial frequency “tuning”.
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Figure 5.6 Differences in receptive field location and size between vision and imagery.
(A) Example visual and imagery receptive fields (RF) for single voxels (B) Average
signed change in RF size from vision to imagery. Positive (negative) values indicate
dilation (shrinkage). (C) Average signed magnitude of shift in RF location from vision to
imagery. Negative values indicate a shift toward fovea. (D) Orientation and magnitude
(line segments) and direction (color-wheel at far right) of RF location shifts (same voxels
as in (B) and (C)) from vision to imagery. The red shaded area in (B) and (C) indicates
significance level 𝑝 < .01 (permutation test) for combined subject data (yellow curve). In
all panels asterix indicates significant difference from null value (red line, 𝑝 < .01,
permutation test; red shading indicates significance threshold for combined data); shading
on curves indicates ±𝑆𝐸.
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Interpretation and Discussion
Summary of Results
We have shown, through building and leveraging imagery encoding models, that
there is a gradient of distortion in imagery receptive field properties traveling down the
visual processing stream. This distortion moves the representations encoded during
imagery towards those seen in higher areas during vision. Specifically, imagery receptive
fields are on average larger and more foveal, and tuning is shifted towards lower spatial
frequencies relative to vision in lower-level areas. This is consistent with the echo effect
that follows from our formulation of mental imagery as inference in an internal,
hierarchical generative model. Furthermore, we have shown that, for the specific task
performed by the subjects in our experiment, the level of clamping happens around area
V4. The implications of this as well as other details and caveats of this study are
discussed in detail in the following sections.

On the Level of Clamping and Use of Complex Stimuli
In this study we chose to use complex natural stimuli for two main reasons. First,
such stimuli approximate what we see and imagine in real life (i.e., of the laboratory).
Secondly, and more importantly, we chose to use complex stimuli because the purpose of
our experiment was to test predictions about the differences between vision and imagery
at all levels of the visual hierarchy, and complex natural stimuli are known to engage the
visual system at all levels (Grill-Spector & Malach 2004; Einhäuser & König 2010;
Çukur et al. 2013) in a subtly different manner than would the sum of their parts (Kayser
et al. 2004; Carandini 2005; Snow et al. 2017). Complex stimuli thus satisfied a
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fundamental requirement of our experimental design. Simple parametric stimuli (e.g.,
bars, gratings, dots) tend to robustly excite only low-level visual areas, and thus would
have been a poor choice for our experiment. However, at first blush it might seem that
using such complex stimuli may leave room for the subjects to "unsuccessfully imagine”
the object (imagine a “zebra” but not imagine the details of the stripes) and might suggest
that using simple stimuli (such as gratings, bars, dots vs. natural stimuli) would make it
easier for subjects to “correctly imagine” the stimuli, subsequently closing the gap in the
differences between vision and imagery that we found in lower areas. This idea however
is based on a common but unfounded assumption and puts forth a scenario that is actually
not inconsistent with our theory.
First, such an argument presupposes that we know what performing imagery perfectly
would imply for the neural activity, suggesting that in order for one to successfully
imagine something, they must imagine it just as it were during vision. This seems
unlikely, given the phenomenological and measured differences between vision and
imagery. Under the generative interpretation to “imagine poorly” simply means to clamp
high. Any lack of detail in imagined images therefore does not indicate a failure of the
subject to imagine correctly but rather reflects a general limit on our capacity to
experience the details of a complex object we are holding in our mind’s eye. In other
words, our model describes why such a limit would exist. Such high-level clamping may
help to explain why mental images lack the specificity of seen ones. High-level visual
areas provide a poor substitute for the visual detail encoded in retinal activity during
vision. Formulated as an echo transformation, inference conditioned on a high-level
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representation of the stimulus will effectively low-pass filter the image representation.
The strongest evidence for this effect comes from the reduced spatial frequency
preference observed in V1 and V2 in all subjects during imagery. Therefore incidentally,
our theory suggests a solution to the issue of indeterminacy discussed in the introduction:
being able imagine a specific object without being able to imagine the details of that
object is perfectly in line with clamping high. For the same reasons, our theory also
explains why vision encoding models are somewhat successful at predicting and
decoding imagery activity (Naselaris et al. 2014; Horikawa & Kamitani 2017), and
characterizes further their intrinsic limitations.
Secondly, it is important to note that a decrease in the differences between vision and
imagery with the use of simpler stimuli/tasks than the one used here does not contradict
our account of imagery, and in fact our model would predict such a change given
variations in the level of reactivation. This is because we do not claim, nor does our
theory compel us to claim, that clamping high is an invariant feature of mental imagery.
In other words, our model does not dictate that there be a gradient in change along a set
portion of the visual hierarchy, only that there exists a gradient in resolution of features
encoded below the clamped level, wherever that may be.
With that said, it seems at the present moment that natural imagery generally involves
clamping relatively high as indicated by numerous studies finding the greatest similarities
between vision and imagery in high-level visual cortex (Pearson et al. 2015). All
experiments showing significant similarity between imagery and vision have also shown
a high degree of asymmetry (quantified in many studies as the decoding accuracy of a
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classifier) in the representations in the early visual cortex (Reddy et al. 2010; Lee et al.
2012). Even in a study that specifically used simple gratings as stimuli, there was
decreased performance of a classifier in V1 during imagery relative to vision (Bosch et
al. 2014) indicating that even with the simplest stimuli there is still a change in the lowest
areas and therefore clamping is likely to generally occur above this level.

Generative vs. Adversarial Imagery
We have interpreted the observed differences between vision and imagery as
evidence of feedback from a high-level visual area clamped to an activity pattern that is
identical to the mean activity pattern evoked during vision. Let’s call this interpretation
“generative”. Yet we might consider an alternate interpretation in which a subject clamps
low but imagines poorly. We will call this the “adversarial” interpretation. Under this
interpretation the clamped activity pattern in V1 during imagery of s is not identical to
the mean activity pattern evoked while seeing s. Rather, the activity pattern is identical to
a blurred or displaced or otherwise corrupted version of s that we’ll call s′. This
“adversarial image”, s′, might get the low-level details of s very wrong while still
preserving enough of s that high-level areas can read off the same features they would if s
were seen. It is possible that such an arrangement could lead to some, but we believe not
all, of the effects we observed in our study. We find the generative interpretation more
plausible than the adversarial interpretation for two reasons.
First, the generative interpretation is most parsimonious. As is discussed above, the
generative interpretation of “imagining poorly” simply means clamping high (e.g.
imagine the correct object “zebra” but fail to imagine the correct frequency of stripes).
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The generative interpretation thus replaces the vague notion “imagines poorly” with a
single discrete hyperparameter, i.e., the level of clamping. As I described above,
clamping high limits spatial resolution and under-specifies features, even if the clamped
activity pattern is a perfect reinstatement of a visual activity pattern. The generative
interpretation thus attributes limits on the specificity of mental images to the limit of
specificity in high-level visual areas that is built-in to the visual system. In contrast, the
adversarial interpretation would require additional concepts to model and predict specific
imperfections in the reinstatement of cortical activity patterns.
Second and most importantly, the sign of the gradients in signal (i.e., activation
amplitude) observed during mental imagery are most compatible with the generative
interpretation. Under the generative interpretation signal should attenuate with distance
below the clamped level. Signal attenuation with distance from source is a stable
configuration for a system–like the visual system–with extensive feedback connections.
For the adversarial interpretation to be compatible with our results signal would have to
amplify with distance from the clamped level for all levels above in such a way that it can
reach activation parity relative to vision near the top of the hierarchy. Such amplification
would be unlikely to yield stable dynamics.

Mental imagery and Attention
Previous fMRI studies have shown that changes in signal amplitude, receptive field
attributes and feature tuning can be induced by changes in a subject’s state of attention
(Womelsdorf et al. 2006; Çukur et al. 2013; Klein et al. 2014; Kay et al. 2015; Vo et al.
2017; Klein et al. 2018).In our study subjects were free to marshal attention as needed to
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form mental images. It is therefore important to consider how the effects that we have
attributed to clamping during mental imagery relate to previously observed attentional
effects. Interestingly, from a purely descriptive perspective with regards to the brain areas
most affected by imagery or attention, the effects we observed in our imagery study are
the opposite of previously observed attention effects. In our study the largest differences
between imagery and vision were seen in V1 and V2. These differences weakened with
ascent of the visual hierarchy. In contrast several attention studies that reported robust
changes in signal amplitude (gain), receptive field size and eccentricity (Klein et al. 2014;
Kay et al. 2015; Vo et al. 2017) and/or feature tuning (Çukur et al. 2013) across different
states of attention found these changes in high-level visual areas and reported no or
smallest changes in V1-V3. Thus it is clear that previously observed attentional effects
were not replicated in our study.
The changes in encoding properties induced by changes in attention have often been
interpreted as evidence of an attention-induced optimization of the allocation of neural
resources. In contrast, we interpret the changes in encoding properties induced by mental
imagery as evidence of an inference process that constrains representations of imagined
visual features in low-level visual areas to resemble representations of seen features in
high-level areas. Whether a similar inference process might be leveraged to explain the
disparate effects on representation observed in attention experiments is an interesting
topic for future research.
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Chapter 6 : Conclusions and Insights Into the Opening
Questions
Summary of Dissertation and Results
We tested the hypothesis that mental imagery is a form of inference conditioned on a
clamped visual activity pattern at a single processing level in a hierarchical generative
model. In Chapter 1, I described the current findings and open questions in the field of
mental imagery that we used as a guide in building this hypothesis. In Chapter 2 I
described how we developed a formalized treatment of this theory and showed
analytically that under this hypothesis activity patterns during imagery are related to
activity patterns during vision via an echo transformation, and that the effects of the echo
transformation could in principle be revealed by estimating imagery encoding models.
Following from these relationships, we predicted that the encoding models would
uncover feature tuning in lower visual areas during imagery that closely resembled tuning
to seen features in higher areas, as well as a gradient in this distortional effect that
increased with hierarchical distance below the clamped area.
In Chapter 3 I described in detail the novel fMRI experiment that we designed and
carried out in order to test these predictions, whereby subjects were cued to imagined
natural object pictures in different positions of the visual field. I also described the fwRF
modeling approach that we used to estimate voxel-wise receptive field and tuning models
from data collect during vision runs, and, for the first time, independently from data
collected from imagery runs. In Chapter 4 I validate the imagery encoding models by
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showing that they can accurately predict activity patterns in response to new stimuli and
can be used to decode both the position and content of imagined objects.
By independently estimating separate visual and imagery encoding models for each
voxel we were able to directly compare changes in encoded features from vision to
imagery across the visual cortex of our subjects. In Chapter 5 I describe the results of this
comparison, which corroborated all of the predicted effects, demonstrating relatively
larger, more foveal receptive fields and lower spatial frequency tuning during imagery in
lower-level visual areas. Additionally, I demonstrated how signal and noise changes from
vision to imagery further favored the hierarchical, generative model. In the following
sections I discuss the implications of our findings to our understanding of mental imagery
by returning to the opening questions.

The Nature of Mental Images and Their Utility
Many aspects of the proposed theory align well with the iconophile stance, and while
we may want to be wary of over-projecting our modern understanding of cognitive
processes onto the writings of ancient thinkers, the re-instantiation of visual information
even appears strikingly similar to Aristotle’s “echoes” of visual percepts. On the other
hand, the theory we propose here also does not disagree with some aspects of the
iconophobe perspective, given that the areas where mental images and percepts seem to
be the most interchangeable (at and above the clamped stage) is where the neural code is
considered to be more language-like than depictive. By providing evidence for a model of
imagery that draws a relationship to vision and emphasizes its representation across a
hierarchy, we have presented a portrayal of imagery that is both depictive and descriptive
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in nature. Certainly, this will not settle the debate once and for all, but such findings do
suggest that we should move away from thinking of imagery within this dichotomy and
focus more on its hierarchical representations.
Concerning utility, our theory is consistent with the intuition that mental imagery
supports reasoning about things and scenes that are not currently present. Our theory
formalizes this intuition by equating the special “reasoning” supported by mental imagery
with inference in a hierarchical generative model. The theory thus implicitly asserts that
we have mental images because inferring the visual consequences of a predicted or
remembered cause can be useful. In visual areas below the clamped area, imagery
facilitates inference about the lower-level details associated with, and left unspecified by,
the clamped representation. The theory presented here thus views imagery as similar to
the phenomenon of “amodal completion” discussed in Revina et al. (2018). It is also
consistent with the model of Kosslyn and colleagues (Kosslyn et al. 2006) that treats
mental imagery as the faculty that allows one to answer questions such as “Do giraffes
have horns?” when no giraffe is handy to inspect. Note that mental imagery is not
consistent with any model of vision that treats low and intermediate processing levels (or
visual areas) as way-stations in the transformation of images into categorical or
propositional representations (e.g., a deep neural network trained to classify objects). Our
theory provides a coherent story for why visual information is encoded during imagery in
lower areas. In other words, in direct contrast to Pylyshyn’s null hypothesis, our theory
posits that structured activations in early visual cortex during imagery are not mere
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epiphenomenal side effects of ordinary reasoning, but rather reflect the fact that low-level
and intermediate representations are in fact worth reasoning about.
If evidence for the theory presented here continues to accumulate it will be interesting
to consider a question that the theory currently does not answer: does the visual system
support inference because mental images help us to reason, or are we able to generate
mental images because inference helps us to see?
How do mental images differ from the ones we see?
In contrast to Hume’s depiction of mental images as differing from percepts only in
intensity, our results have revealed a significant change in the visual features encoded
during mental imagery in the lower parts of the visual hierarchy. Therefore, it appears
that visual images are not simply fainter versions of percepts but instead have a more
complex relationship to vision: mental images closely resemble percepts in higher areas,
but are distorted relative to percepts in terms of the representations they occupy in lowerlevel areas. This would suggest that the details of imagined objects are difficult to make
out not because they are faint, but because the resolution is simply not there.
Interestingly, recent studies have linked the subjective vividness of mental imagery
to the similarity of representations in visual cortex during vision and imagery (Dijkstra et
al. 2017, 2019). In the theory presented here the similarity between imagery and vision is
determined, and crucially limited, by the hierarchical level at which an activity pattern is
clamped. Our results suggest that in our experiments clamping occurred at least as high
as V4. At and above V4 the distortion of spatial tuning and receptive field attributes
95

during mental imagery relative to vision were much less than in areas lower in the
hierarchy. In summary, within our model, imagery differs from vision (both subjectively
and empirically) in that the specific inference it imposes on the visual system results in a
distortion in the features encoded below the clamped area.

Vision Synthesis in the Absence of Retinal Input
By tying mental imagery to inference we have provided a potential explanation for
how mental imagery could utilize visual representations but encode them in different
activity patterns. We have also given empirical support to the intuition that we imagine to
“see” the visual consequences of predictions and memories. Our work also extends the
power and relevance of the generative perspective on vision. Previous results relating
vision to inference have supplied evidence that representations in biological visual
systems are adapted to the structure of the visual environment (Olshausen & Field 1996;
Karklin & Lewicki 2009; Berkes et al. 2011). Other studies relating vision to the related
concept of predictive coding have supplied evidence that knowledge of the visual
environment can be combined with contextual information to represent the visual
structure of occluded scenes (Muckli et al. 2015) and of illusory contours (De Haas &
Schwarzkopf 2018). The current results provide additional compelling evidence that
highly structured representations can emerge independently of retinal input (Berkes et al.
2011; Vetter et al. 2014) allowing the visual system to reason coherently about the visual
environment even when there is nothing to see.
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